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ETHNO-CONFESSIONAL COMPONENTS OF THE INTERNAL POLITICAL CONFLICT IN IRAQ

The main goal of this study is to analyze the ethno-confessional aspects of the internal political conflict in Iraq in order to reveal the causes and consequences of the conflict and develop recommendations to promote a peaceful settlement. The justification of the topic is based on the presence of ethno-confessional differences in the country, the existence of different cultural and religious groups, such as Sunnis and Shiites, Kurds and Yazidis, as well as other ethnic groups, which creates complexity and vulnerability for Iraqi society, and leads to regular conflicts and tensions. Understanding the ethno-confessional aspects of the conflict in Iraq can contribute to some increase in the scientific significance of the study for the analysis of interethnic and interreligious conflicts, as well as have a positive impact on the search for political and social strategies for the peaceful resolution of conflicts on an international scale. The study of the ethno-confessional components of the conflict in Iraq from a practical point of view can be useful for international organizations, human rights groups and humanitarian agencies in developing programs and projects to improve the situation in the region and promote peaceful conflict resolution. The event analysis was implied as the main basic research method, supported fragmentarily by historical, functional, geopolitical methods. As a result, the study of ethno-confessional components of the internal political conflict in Iraq may retain an interest of international actors in the stability of Iraq, which furthermore opens up opportunities for diplomatic initiatives.

Key words: ethno-confessional components, a peaceful settlement, interethnic and interreligious conflicts, cultural and religious groups, international organizations, human rights groups.

Formulation of the problem in general form, its relation to scientific or practical problems. Recent years, when cultural and religious diversity in the modern world has become part of the social fabric, could be characterized by

complicated issues involving tolerant ethnic and religious relationships, as well as appropriate understanding or conflict. The conflicts with a noticeable ethnic component cause high levels of violence not only at the national level, but also in interstate relations. This case study has been applied towards Iraq, an intersection country of world religious and cultural influences. As of 2022, Iraq has a population of approximately 40.5 million. The main ethnic groups are Arabs (75–80%) and Kurds (15–20%), and the religious groups are Shiite Muslims (61–64%) and Sunni Muslims (29–34%). This motley social picture emerged after World War I, when, according to the Treaty of Sèvres, the territory of Mesopotamia was created between the Entente and the defeated Ottoman Empire, which was placed under the mandate (actually under colonial control) of the United Kingdom. In this territory, the British created the mandated Kingdom of Iraq in 1921 (Bulin, 2022). The subject is scientifically justified by the deep and complex aspects of Iraqi society. Ethno-confessional schisms in the nation, including Sunnis vs. Shiites and Kurds, along with other ethnic groups, are extremely important in determining the political dynamics that characterize society and culture. Iraqi society is complicated and exposed due to the presence of distinct cultural and religious groups, which results in periodic conflicts and tensions. Iraq is a prominent player in the international community, and its political stability is of utmost concern to the global community. However, there is tension due to ethnic and religious differences, resulting in internal unrest or the danger of threats to security.

The research objectives of work are as follows:

1. To analyze the ethno-confessional aspects of the internal political conflict in Iraq.
2. To illustrate what causes and affects the conflict, as well as the generation of recommendations towards a peace settlement.
3. To examine how international actors contributed to the genesis and escalation of the conflict in Iraq.
4. To produce unique guidelines for international institutions, humanitarian organizations, civil society groups, and humanitarian agencies on how to achieve a peaceful solution to the dispute in the conflict in Iraq, and to protect the stability and security of the region.

The examination of the aspects of Iraqi interethnic and interreligious conflict may activate an increasing interest in the appropriate studies for the scientists on the subject, as well as be helpful for international bodies, especially for humanitarian organizations and human rights groups, within their practical activities while running different programs and projects to ease the regional or local situation and implement peaceful conflict resolution.

Analysis of recent research and publications, methodological basis of the study. Analysis of the existing research materials and publications devoted to the problems of cultural and religious diversity and ethno-confessional components of the internal conflicts in modern world demonstrates a wide range of approaches to these issues. State documents and archival materials of international organizations like UNHCR, International Red Cross, and US Department of State portray the official image of government in Iraq on ethnic and religious issues. Public opinion and responses to ethnic and religious events in Iraq are reflected in press materials. Iraqi and foreign publishing articles and reports can guide us through the relationships between different ethnic and religious groups and conflict resolution mechanisms. Domestic and foreign scholars have studied the preamble to internal conflicts in the

Iraqi arena over the past decades, in particular, Oleksandr Bulin “Boiling Cauldron: the Ethno-Confessional Factor of the Iraqi Conflict” (2022) and Serhii Shulyak “Ethnic conflict in the theory of international relations: the realist view” (2012) from Ukraine; Mari Luomi “Sectarian identities or Geopolitics? The Regional Shia-Sunni Divide in the Middle East” (2008) from Finland; Nasir Al Samaraie ‘Humanitarian implications of the wars in Iraq’ (2007) and Shivan Fazel “Addressing challenges to tolerance and religious diversity in Iraq” (2023) from Iraq; Yasemin Akbaba and Zeynep Taydas “Does Religious Discrimination Promote Dissent? A Quantitative Analysis” (2011) from Turkey; Sarah Edcumbe “Islamic State, Disputed Territory and Ethno-Religious Diversity: An Opportunity for the Development of Iraq’s National Policy on Displacement” (2019) from England; Daniel Byman “Constructing a Democratic Iraq: Challenges and Opportunities” (2003), Ted Robert Gurr “Peoples against the State: Ethnopolitical conflict in the changing world system” (1994) and Donald Horowitz “Ethnic Groups in Conflict” (1985) from the USA; Majeed Hawkar and Hossain Ishtiaq “Conflict Dynamics in Post-2003 Iraq: A Security Dilemma Perspective” (2021) from Malaysia; Abid Abdulmajid “Religious Diversity and Conflict in the Middle East” from Belgium (2018), Ziyad Abdulqadir “The cultural diversity of contemporary Iraq in the light of security threats and conflicts between its components” from Poland (2021), Liora Lukitz “Iraq: The Search for National Identity” (1997) from Israel.

In light of the above, the works mentioned are a vital starting point for developing comprehensive strategies to counter information attacks and propaganda, integrating theoretical and applied approaches to understanding this phenomenon.

The research method of the study was based first of all on the event analysis with fragmental implementation of historical, functional, and geopolitical methods. The review of international reports and recommendations supported by cautious conclusions that were drawn in the mentioned article may retain an interest of international actors in the stability of Iraq and turn into possible diplomatic initiatives.

Formulation of the goals of the article, presentation of the main research material with full substantiation of scientific results. Internal conflicts cause serious problems, such as economic and political decline, and pose a threat to stability not only within the country itself, but also in neighboring states and the region as a whole. In the context of internal strife, serious problems like the deterioration of economy and politics arise, threatening stability that concerns not just the country, but also neighboring states and the whole region. “As the level of religious discrimination against ethno-religious groups increases, the probability of rebellion and civil war heightens, controlling for several other state and group-level factors” (Akbada & Taydas, 2011, p. 271). For Iraq, the war has caused extensive human casualties and has drawn a major international focus. The peculiarity of this conflict is that it was also a foreign intervention on the part of the USA, which sought both to overthrow Saddam Hussein and restore order and stability in the country. Though the operation succeeded in bringing down Saddam Hussein from power, establishing stability there has been an increasingly difficult task. After intervention in Iraq, violent confrontations broke out between US troops and insurgents, and between the Shiites and Sunnis. “Without an understanding of the history – both religious and social – of the Middle East, it will be impossible for Western actors to establish a coherent policy for the region. Sectarian divisions have surfaced in all Arab states in the aftermath of the war in Iraq, and they can no longer be ignored in policymaking” (Luomi, 2008, p. 48).

Since America's invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iraq has been plunged into a long period of turmoil, with armed groups like the Islamic State taking advantage of the power vacuum created by disbanding the army and banning Saddam Hussein's Ba'ath Party. In 2014, the Islamic State began an attack on Iraq from Syria, occupying part of Anbar Province, then spreading into the north of the country and taking Mosul in June 2014. Following this, the U.S. launched air strikes against Islamic State militants in Iraq and Syria and formed an international coalition against the terrorist group. Iran has also joined operations in Iraq alongside the Iraqi army, local tribes, and Kurdish Peshmerga, and has regained control of a number of cities, including Mosul in 2017 (Hawkar & Ishtiaq, 2021, p. 20–23).

Starting from the local military victory of the Islamic State, the vast majority of foreign troops have pulled back, and only a small US contingent remains to support the fight against terrorism in Iraq. But sectarian tension among Iraqi sectarian groups is also driving the country towards more instability, particularly after the assassination of the prime minister and a political crisis. Newly elected administrations (whether the president or the prime minister) now need to bring some stability to the country, and even the possibility of ruling the country under internal and external challenges. Sadly, Iraq fulfills all possible criteria for an all-encompassing and hostile politicization of ethnicity. At the time of independence in 1932, its population included 21% Arab-Sunni, 14% mainly Kurdish Sunni, 53% Arab Shiites, 5% non-Muslim Arabs, the largest of whom were the Jews of Baghdad, and 6% other religious-linguistic groups like Sunni Turkmen in northern Iraq or various Christian sectors who speak Assyrian. Secondly, and most important of all, there were a few modern civic organizations, and none had a trans-ethnic reach. Most of the aforementioned religious-linguistic groups were divided into tribes and tribal confederations, especially the Kurds and Shiites. A considerable part of the population had nomadic beekeepers (estimated at 35% in 1867 and 5% in 1947) and the vast majorities were farmers and peasants. Literacy rates were between 5 and 10 percent in the desolate provinces of the Ottoman Empire that later became Iraq (Wimmer, 2003, p. 6).

Ted Robert Gurr, an American researcher of political processes from the University of Maryland, argues that “the main problem of the most serious ethno-political conflicts of today is the struggle for power between ethnic groups immediately after the formation of states, revolutions and the efforts of autocratic regimes to democratize.” These conflicts were exacerbated by fault lines between civilizations and religious traditions. Political clubs, patriotic reading groups, public associations, trade unions and farmers' associations were not expected to arise in this social context. Therefore, the new leaders and the various political factions in the new parliament relied almost exclusively on appeals to the unity of a single ethno-religious group to gain support and legitimacy in the country (Gurr, 1994).

A Swiss sociologist Andreas Wimmer (the Lieber Professor of Sociology and Political Philosophy at Columbia University) made an attractive presentation “Democracy and Ethno-Religious Conflict in Iraq” at Stanford and Bonn Universities where he briefly described some complex fluctuations within Iraqi society since the end of the First World War, and namely since the 1921 Cairo Conference, described in the official minutes as Middle East Conference. The most important decision of the Conference, which was held in Cairo and Jerusalem, March 12 to 30, 1921, was to transfer control

of the territory east of the Jordan River (Transjordan) to Abdullah bin Hussein, while his brother Faisal bin Hussein was to become king of the new Kingdom of Iraq. Both continued to receive instructions and financial support from Great Britain. Thus, from the time the British appointed Faisal, a descendant of the Hashemite dynasty and commander of the Arab forces that had defeated the Ottoman armies in the Middle East, as king of Iraq, ethnic politics in Mesopotamia dominated. Faisal himself and his inner circle were ardent supporters of the pan-Arab nationalism that had once been highly valued by the Ottoman elite. They controlled political life in the first decades of independence, appointing almost half of the prime ministers during the Mandate and the monarchy until 1958. Others came from old Ottoman official families or were prominent Sunni figures from Baghdad. Of the 23 prime ministers appointed during this period, only four were Shia. This new Sunni Arab elite had witnessed a complete lack of national unity in Iraq throughout the 1920s. The introduced idea of an Arab nation, which was supposed to become the ideological basis of the nation-building process, was hardly known at all to the country's Arabic-speaking population. They understood their obligations and liabilities to their clan, their village, their guild, their sheikh, but not to the peoples inhabiting Syria and Egypt, about whom they knew little or nothing at all. The new rulers wanted to overcome this fragmented disunity, and unify the different groups into a self-confident Arab nation capable to withstand European expansion. "In contrast to the multi-cultural Ottoman empire, the new regime envisioned the compulsory assimilation of the different minorities – in fact the large majority of the population—into the mainstream of Arabism and implicitly Sunni Islam, which was regarded as the centerpiece of the nation's cultural heritage and its foremost contribution to world history" (Wimmer, 2003, p. 6).

This is considered the main cause of the nation's cultural decline and its greatest contribution to world history. The most important instruments for achieving this goal, as in any modern nation-building project, were the school system, the army, and the central administration. The army introduced universal conscription without distinction of religion or tribe. The central administration, headed by specialists from Baghdad, put an end to a century of indirect rule that had remained largely untouched in this remote part of the empire by the Ottoman reforms of the 19th century and the experiments of the Young Turks. As Pan-Arabism developed and spread, Sunni Arab groups gradually displaced other ethno-religious groups in the army, the administration, and later in the Baath Party. A few examples illustrate this process: as early as 1936, only two out of 61 officers were not Sunni Arabs. Under the monarchy, Kurds continued to hold 15% of executive positions and 25% of subordinate positions in the administration. An unknown but significant proportion of Jewish Arabs held these positions in the early 1930s. In the decade after 1958, Kurds held only 2% of executive and 13% of subordinate positions in the administration, and Jews were completely excluded from the government.

Not only the Kurds in Iraq, Syria, Iran, and Turkey, but the Bakonjo in Western Uganda, the Basques in Spain, and the Sikhs in the Indian Punjab all went through such movements of differentiation. In each case, the boundary between them and a group in close proximity was porous. Acculturation to the norms of the neighboring group was common. This might include abandonment of one's own language or religious practices. Changes in individual ethnic identity might follow. In this way, elites were lost to the group, and the language and culture of the group were frequently disparaged. Kurds in Iraqi cities underwent Arabization, Bakonjo borrowed

Batoro rites and language, Basques became Castilianized, and the line between Sikhs and Hindus was uncertain (Horowitz, 1985, p. 72).

Between 1952 and 1963, Shiites still made up 54% of the members of the Baath Party's Central Committee. Their share fell to 6% between 1963 and 1970 (Wimmer, 2003, p. 7). Over the years, the pan-Arab factions gained power, becoming increasingly radicalized, to a point where, in the 1930s, they embraced fascism, while under Baath in 1968. Their goal, building a single Arab (Sunni) nation, was never achieved. As each and every regime's initiative to impose its own vision of society was met or rejected, resistance became ever fiercer, and repression and domination became more ruthless. And it only furthered the feeling that those who would not agree to the idea of a state of one Arab nation were the ones more under the dominion of the "ethnic others."

But maybe this could have been different? In Iraq, there were two periods in history when it appeared this tangible spiral of ethno-religious hostility could be halted. There was the period of Bakr Siddiqui in 1936/37 that took its inspiration from Kemalist Turkey. He aimed to advance a general and distinctly multi-ethnic Iraqi nationalism. Politics during Qasem's tenure (1958–1963) at the outset were heavily dominated by the Communist Party when many groups of the newly created territories in the new suburbs worked closely together with the ruling party and its Central Committees, many of which included the largest ethno-religious groups during its power. Qasem's friendly Free Officers had championed social reforms, such as a serious attempt at land reform and the abandonment of indirect rule in the tribal districts. Qasem was a Kurd by birth and saw Iraq as a multi-ethnic state, an ethnically mixed nation, like Bakr. Kurds and Shiites were well represented in his National Revolutionary Command Council, the Free Officers group responsible for the coup, and his cabinet. Unfortunately, both of these regimes proved to be politically too weak to confront the Arab circles in the army, which were both supporters of city leaders and members of the increasing bureaucratic class. For them, national construction and political integration meant sharing power and privileges with other forces in the army, bureaucracy, and government. Also, even the trans-ethnic political parties supporting these two regimes could not get out of the process behind the centrifugal forces of ethnic difference. This is demonstrated by the Communist party history: the Kurdish sister party of the Communists in the 1940s fused with the left-wing Kurdish officers who had been separated from the army, in the form of pan-Arabism in the officer corps, by the emergence of left-wing branches. In 1949, they joined the new party (Hizb Rizgari Kurd) to become the new Kurdish Democratic Party. In 1957, the Kurdish branch of the Iraqi Communist Party, which was becoming increasingly aligned with the pan-Arabist camp, split and also became part of the KDP. So for 20 years, the communist movement was split on ethnic lines. The Kurds refused to integrate their economy and military forces into those of the central government dominated by Shiites (and previously, under Saddam, by Sunnis) since each group relies on its command of military and economic assets to consolidate and maintain whatever power it may have. "The Kurds of Iraq constitute a distinct group that is collected by the ethnicity, culture and language that it commons with the rest of the Kurds" (Abdulqadir, 2012, p.74). Regarding the religious aspect, the Kurdish population belongs to various faiths and religions: most of them are classified as Sunni Muslims; Shias minorities are represented by Fayli, Lur, and Shabak, and some of them are the followers of the Kaka'i and Yazidi religions.

One of the most distinguishing characteristics of Iraq's population is its extraordinary religious and ethnic diversity. Iraq has an estimated population of 33 million people and has a wide variety of ethnic and religious minorities, according to the World Bank. These groups include Christians, Kurds, Turkmen, Assyrians, and Yazidis, as well as other minority communities in Iraq. Roughly 96 percent of the population of the country is Muslim, according to the International Minority Rights Group. Most are split; however, into a large Shia Arab majority, a Sunni Arab minority, and an ethnic Kurdish minority that is also largely Sunni. Ethnic Shabaks, Turkmen, Fayli Kurds, Palestinians, Roma, Christians, Sabaeen-Mandaeans, Yazidis and Baha'is constitute close to 10 percent of the population, most are Shia, Sunni or both (Fazel, 2023). The minorities in Iraq have been heavily linguistically controlled, and their language rights are constrained, as it is essential to ensure their right to free expression. For instance, in spite of constitutional guarantees, Turkmen are barred from their language being taught in schools. In some cases, the denial of linguistic rights adversely affected some minority languages. For instance, Assyrian (also known as Aramaic) is officially classed by UNESCO as a "critically endangered" language. Minorities also experience linguistic restrictions, as well as religious discrimination that borders on persecution. Violence is often used to attack Christian minorities. In 2010, there were reports in Mosul that people were stopped on the street, asked for their passports, and shot if they had a surname or first name corresponding to Assyrian or Christian origin. Yazidis are yet another group who were targeted, where in 2007 they suffered the most horrific strike on any group in Iraq due to the alcohol trade. The Yezidis today number around 100,000 and are mainly found in Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. The sense of belonging to a specific religious group demarcated the degree of socialization within the society in some cases, like the situation of the Yezidi Kurds in northern Iraq who were for decades marginalized by the majority of Sunni Kurds in what is known today as the Kurdistan Region. This marginalization used to have different aspects such as exclusion from power centers, constraints on businesses and trade relations, and the lack of basic services in most of Yezidi areas in comparison to the prosperous cities of Iraqi Kurdistan (Abdulmajid, 2018, p. 2).

The human rights situation faced by minorities in Iraq remains challenging at all levels: political, civil and cultural. Iraq's ethnic and religious minorities, along with other vulnerable groups, continue to face threats of violence, religious discrimination, exclusion and denial of their own property rights. The consequences of this have far-reaching implications for Iraq's social cohesion, national unity and capacity to overcome sectarian violence. Although some civil society groups have noted improvements in the overall situation, the survival of Iraq's national minorities in terms of religious, linguistic and cultural identity remains at risk. Most minorities and vulnerable groups continue to be the target of threats and violence based on religious and ethnic identity. As a result, members of minority communities continue to flee the country in search of safety and protection outside its borders. "Individuals and families forced to leave their homes and neighborhoods and find alternative accommodation elsewhere in the same city or in other cities within the country normally choose their place of refuge according to ethnic or religious and sectarian considerations" (Al Samaraie, 2007, p. 940).

Moreover, the process of crossing borders by displaced persons is a two-way process. The improvement in the situation of national minority rights within Iraq

itself has triggered an influx of displaced persons from neighboring countries and border regions. Iraq hosted around 338,000 refugees and asylum-seekers, by the end of 2024, including 304,000 Syrians most of them Kurdish ethnicity. Iraq also has totally over 1 million IDPs (internally displaced persons), with 109,000 persons living in 21 camps in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. In late 2024, the fall of the Syrian regime led by Bashar al-Assad marked the beginning of significant geopolitical changes, but Syrian refugees in Iraq still remain cautious about returning. “A UNHCR survey in January 2025 found that only 12 percent of Syrian refugees in Iraq plan to return within the next year” (UNHCR. The UN Refugee agency, 2025, p.4).

Research findings and prospects for further research in this area. A detailed analysis of historical facts prompts the development of some recommendations for resolving the conflict in Iraq.

Promotion of dialogue and exchange among ethnic and religious groups in Iraq is one of the important steps towards a peaceful coexistence and conflict management. Inter-religious and intra-ethnic concord is attainable after proactively pursuing intersectional negotiations and initiatives together to seek common solutions and foster mutual understanding.

The implementation of local community development and economic recovery in Iraq could be able to bring a crucial reduction in ethnic and religious tensions and also facilitate creating favorable conditions for peaceful coexistence. Some of such initiatives consist of infrastructure initiatives, small businesses support, agricultural support, the provision of access to education and health, and social services.

Access to education and cultural resources for all communities also helps mitigate the negative impact of stigmatization, which may result from ethnic and religious differences. Development of educational initiatives designed to ensure the cultural/linguistic diversity needs of various groups are considered in the design of educational programs. Furthermore, creating cultural activities and programs that encourage interaction between ethnic and religious groups is another way to foster cooperation and increase tolerance and understanding between them. Thus, to resolve the conflict and protect the human rights of those citizens to whom all this is addressed, the development of democratic institutions and the rule of law in Iraq is crucial. This involves providing for legal certainty, protecting human rights, and barring discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or religion.

Building democratic institutions that provide a platform for fair and free elections would facilitate the participation of all in governance and the construction of a united and just society.

All humanitarian efforts, including medical and medical help to people in the midst of conflict, irrespective of ethnic or religious identity, can contribute to security and human rights. This also means supporting survivors of violence, refugees & internally displaced people and providing medical facilities and rehabilitation programs for victims.

Participate in disarmament and demobilization programs to reduce violence and confrontation in the region. Such as demilitarization programs to remove arms from civilian populations and disband the armed groups contributing to instability and insecurity. Such initiatives play a part in peaceful resolution of conflicts and in encouraging trust between different ethnic and religious minorities.

Enabling elections and democratic processes of all ethnic and religious populations in elections and the democratic sphere, guarantees their recognition under the laws and

gives them a voice in government. That means ensuring that a welcoming environment is set up for everyone to take part in the electoral processes, protect them from intimidation or intimidation and that their rights to freedom of expression are guaranteed, freedom of speech, assembly, and expression. Polling platforms also must cater for all inhabitants, especially those living in remote regions or with scarce information.

International support for peace-building and international diplomatic activities: Involvement of the international community to contribute to peace-building efforts of the security community will help address the problem and keep the peace of Iraq and the area peaceful in the long run. This involves providing assistance to international organizations and partners to formulate and implement peace solutions, the establishment and implementation of international mechanisms of mediation, peacekeeping, and peacekeeping. It is also vitally important to align work with all relevant parties to assist in political accords between states and in peacemaking and negotiation.

Conclusions. This article discusses the relevance of religion in the era of ethnic nationalism and revolutionary wars. The question is whether religion plays a significant role in violence, and whether its importance has developed over time, or not. Data analysis concludes that religious and nonreligious ethnic nationalism together led to roughly the same amount of conflict, but since 1980, religious nationalist ethnic groups have produced more violent conflict compared to non-religious ethnic groups. These results have a variety of implications. First, they demonstrate that religion can shape conflict—but it's not the only influence. Second, the impact of religion in conflict can vary over time. Third, the role of religion in conflict is growing. That contradicts the mainstream paradigms of modernization and secularization that dominated recent social science for much of the 20th century and that foresaw the end of religion as a relevant political and social influence in the modern age.

From this analysis of the ethno-confessional elements of the internal political strife in Iraq emerged several major findings. To achieve the tasks of the work, a comprehensive profiling of the ethnic and religious factors in this country was studied, considering the historical background of the country and how it influences present circumstances is presented. From that data, it was found that different ethnic and religious groups in Iraq are of great varieties that form an intricate social, cultural, and political background that causes the conflict to develop as well as to intensify. One of the objectives of the study was to investigate the interaction of global concerns in the initiation and advancement of the outbreak and escalation of conflict. Geopolitics, external forces, and relations with neighboring countries play a huge role in the dynamics of the Iraq conflict, it concluded.

Recommendations for international organizations and humanitarian agencies, in line with the findings, are the need to implement initiatives designed to promote dialogue and cooperation between Iraq's various ethnic and religious groups. In this regard, it is also crucial to promote local community development programs, access to education and cultural resources for every group of the population, democratic institutions, and the rule of law. The international community should also be a facilitator of peace-building and a mediator for the peaceful resolution of the fighting. The conclusion to be drawn is that the acceptance of these recommendations and the actions taken to implement the same could lead in the peaceful solution of the conflict in Iraq, achieve stability, security, and also contribute to democracy and protect the rights of the citizens of the country in the process of fighting this conflict.

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ЕТНО-КОНФЕСІЙНІ СКЛАДОВІ ВНУТРІШНЬОГО ПОЛІТИЧНОГО КОНФЛІКТУ В ІРАКУ

Резюме

Головною метою цього дослідження є аналіз етно-конфесійних аспектів внутрішньополітичного конфлікту в Іраку з метою виявлення причин і наслідків конфлікту та розробки рекомендацій щодо сприяння мирному врегулюванню. Обґрунтування теми базується на наявності етно-конфесійних відмінностей у країні, існуванні різних культурних та релігійних груп, таких як суніти та шиїти, курди та езиди, а також інших етнічних груп, що створює складність та вразливість для іракського суспільства та призводить до регулярних конфліктів та напруженості. Розуміння етно-конфесійних аспектів конфлікту в Іраку може сприяти певному підвищенню наукової значущості дослідження для аналізу міжетнічних та міжрелігійних конфліктів, а також позитивно вплинути на пошук політичних та соціальних стратегій мирного врегулювання конфліктів у міжнародному масштабі. Вивчення етно-конфесійних складових конфлікту в Іраку з практичної точки зору може бути корисним для міжнародних організацій, правозахисних груп та гуманітарних агентств у розробці програм та проєктів, спрямованих на покращення ситуації в регіоні та сприяння мирному вирішенню конфлікту. Аналіз подій мався на увазі як основний базовий метод дослідження, фрагментарно підкріплений історичним, функціональним, геополітичним методами. Як наслідок, вивчення етно-конфесійних складових внутрішньополітичного конфлікту в Іраку може зберегти інтерес міжнародних суб'єктів до стабільності Іраку, що також відкриває можливості для дипломатичних ініціатив.

Ключові слова: етно-конфесійні складові, мирне врегулювання, міжетнічні та міжрелігійні конфлікти, культурні та релігійні групи, міжнародні організації, правозахисні групи.

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