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REMOTE VOTING IN THE CONTEXT OF THE POST-WAR TRANSFORMATION OF UKRAINE'S ELECTORAL PROCESS

The article offers a political-science analysis of remote voting as a potential element of the post-war transformation of Ukraine's electoral process. The relevance of the study stems from large-scale internal and external population displacement, the destruction of electoral infrastructure, and the need to ensure citizens' equal access to the first elections after the termination or lifting of martial law. The aim is to identify the political and institutional conditions for applying remote forms of voting, taking into account requirements of accessibility, trust, ballot secrecy, and the legitimacy of results. The methodological basis consists of institutional, systemic, and comparative approaches, a case study of Ukraine, secondary analysis of sociological data, and elements of scenario analysis. Drawing on the cases of Estonia, Switzerland, out-of-country voting in Italy, and Ukrainian empirical data, three scenarios of post-war adaptation of the electoral process are identified: conservative, combined, and digital phased. It is argued that for the first post-war elections, priority should be given to expanding accessibility without a radical change to the voting procedure itself, while internet voting is best regarded as a medium- to long-term prospect. The study emphasizes that remote voting should be considered as part of a broader institutional adaptation of election administration to the territorial dispersion of the Ukrainian electorate rather than as a purely technological innovation. Particular attention is given to the distinction between postal and internet voting and to the possibility of combining remote participation mechanisms with the preservation of established safeguards for electoral integrity. The findings provide a basis for assessing alternative models of post-war electoral adaptation and for developing a gradual approach to the digital transformation of Ukraine's electoral process.
Key words: remote voting, internet voting, electoral process, trust, Ukraine.

Formulation of the problem in general form, its relation to scientific or practical problems. The full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war has substantially changed the conditions for exercising citizens' political rights. Mass internal displacement, the prolonged stay of millions of Ukrainians abroad, the temporary occupation of territories, and damage to electoral infrastructure mean that the first nationwide elections after the termination or lifting of martial law will take place in a social and territorial environment different from that of the elections before February 24, 2022. Restoring the electoral process will therefore require not a mechanical return

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to pre-war procedures but an adaptation of election administration to a territorially dispersed electorate.

The practical scale of the problem is already being documented by the CEC and civic research. In January 2026, the Central Election Commission approved proposals for the legislative regulation of nationwide elections after martial law (Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 2026b). According to CEC Deputy Chair Serhii Dubovyk, 4–4.5 million Ukrainian voters may be abroad, while the existing network comprises only 104 out-of-country polling stations; 393 polling stations within Ukraine have been irreversibly destroyed, and about a thousand more require restoration (Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 2026c). At the same time, research by OPORA showed that 28.5% of citizens with a registered place of residence in fact live at a different address, and among those who were displaced after February 24, 2022, this figure reaches 76.5% (Civil Network OPORA, 2026a).

The problem is especially pronounced with regard to citizens abroad. In a 2026 study by OPORA and the Rating Sociological Group, 74% of surveyed Ukrainians in Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic declared their readiness to take part in post-war elections, yet only 49% were willing to update their voting address on their own; after direct outreach from the state, this figure rose to 61%. Among those willing to update their data, 82% named the Diia app as the most convenient channel, while among those unwilling to do so, the main barriers were distrust of the state and concerns about the protection of personal data (Civil Network OPORA, 2026c). This demonstrates that digital accessibility alone does not equate to political trust.

Under these conditions, remote voting takes on significance as a set of procedures that allow the expression of the will of voters without personal attendance at a traditional polling station. This concerns above all postal and internet voting. International experience shows different trajectories of their institutionalization. In Estonia, 312,181 valid internet votes were counted in the 2023 parliamentary elections, while 301,620 voters used paper ballots at polling stations (State Electoral Office of Estonia, 2023). Switzerland, by contrast, is developing electronic voting through limited trials and the principle of "security before speed" (Federal Chancellery, n.d.). The difference between these models shows that the political acceptability of remote voting depends not only on technology but also on the institutional environment, oversight, and accumulated experience.

For Ukraine, it is also important to distinguish between the digitalization of election administration and the digitalization of the act of voting itself. In May 2026, Acting Minister of Digital Transformation Oleksandr Borniakov, commenting on the possibility of using Diia for elections, emphasized that the key issue is ensuring ballot secrecy rather than the app's technical capabilities (Saienko, 2026). In the author's earlier study, internet voting was analyzed through the relationship between political participation, cybersecurity, trust, and legitimacy under martial law (Osadtsa, 2026). The post-war context requires a broader framing of the issue – determining the place of various remote procedures in the transformation of the electoral process and in ensuring the participation of citizens who, as a result of the war, find themselves in different territorial and social circumstances.

The core scholarly problem lies in the need to reconcile two tasks of post-war election recovery – ensuring the real participation of a territorially dispersed citizenry while preserving trust in the procedure and its results. The traditional model of

in-person voting can create disproportionate barriers for part of the electorate abroad, IDPs, and citizens with limited access to electoral infrastructure. At the same time, remote procedures also change the architecture of electoral control: postal voting raises questions of identification, the independence of the voter's choice, and the delivery and accounting of ballots, while internet voting additionally raises questions of cybersecurity, verifiability, and the protection of ballot secrecy.

The Ukrainian institutional debate illustrates this tension. CEC Chair Oleh Didenko in January 2026 called internet and postal voting too risky specifically for the first post-war elections (Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 2026a). At the same time, simply rejecting alternative mechanisms does not remove the problem of accessibility: according to OPORA, only 37% of surveyed Ukrainians in Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic considered their return after the lifting of martial law rather or very likely, while 48% considered it unlikely (Civil Network OPORA, 2026c). Voting by citizens abroad may therefore remain a structural challenge even after the war ends.

Comparative experience also shows that expanding access does not necessarily mean an immediate move to internet voting. International IDEA and the European Parliament emphasize the need for early coordination with the states hosting Ukrainian voters (International IDEA & European Parliament, 2023). During consultations of the Ukrainian delegation in Italy in 2024, the experience of the Peruvian community in Florence was studied, among other things: for more than 10,000 Peruvian citizens, 35 polling stations are typically organized there, including outside the logic of a single diplomatic mission (Shypilova, 2024). This illustrates the possibility of combining traditional, postal, and digital mechanisms.

Analysis of recent research and publications, methodological basis of the study. The scholarly discourse on remote forms of voting encompasses several interrelated strands: the effect of alternative voting methods on electoral participation, the factors behind public acceptance of new electoral technologies, the role of institutional trust, the organization of voting for citizens abroad, and the functioning of elections in crisis and post-crisis conditions.

The first strand concerns the effect of remote procedures on participation. Goodman N. and Stokes L. (2020), using Canadian data, find a positive but comparatively limited effect of internet voting on turnout. Germann M. (2021), by contrast, shows a more pronounced mobilizing effect for citizens living abroad. Solvak M. and Vassil K. (2018) draw attention to the formation of a habit of internet voting, while Stockemer D. and Wigginton M. (2024) emphasize the complexity of the causal link between the digital channel and overall turnout. Abdala M. (2024) further shows the importance of direct costs of participation in the choice of voting method. For Ukraine, these findings are important given the sharp increase in the spatial and organizational costs of participation after 2022.

Studies of postal voting show that convenience and trust can operate in opposite directions. Nemčok M. and Peltoniemi J. (2023) show that greater distance to a polling station increases the appeal of postal voting, but low trust can discourage its use. Nyhuis D., Harmening M., Münchow F., and Baumert J.-F. (2025), comparing the postal systems of 18 European countries, find substantial differences in ballot requirements, identification, deadlines, and submission procedures, which effectively means there is no single "best" model.

The second strand focuses on public perceptions of the specific design of electoral technologies. Turnbull-Dugarte S. and Devine D. (2023) show that support for digitalization depends on the characteristics of the procedure itself, not merely on general attitudes toward technology. Decman M. and Kozel E. (2023), Romanov B., Dueñas-Cid D., and Leets P. (2025), Sindermann C. et al. (2023), as well as Abdala M., Plescia C., Boyer M., and Brunetti A. (2025), distinguish between technological and institutional trust and demonstrate the importance of both dimensions for the acceptance of internet voting. Ukrainian data confirm a similar tension: in a 2023 OPORA study, electronic voting was the most convenient remote method for Ukrainians abroad and could potentially secure the participation of 77% of respondents, yet the level of trust in it stood at 68%, compared with 76% for voting at a polling station (Civil Network OPORA, 2023).

Of particular importance to this work is the study by Nyhuis D. and Münchow F. (2026), which used a discrete choice experiment to compare postal-voting options in Germany. Voters generally correctly identified mechanisms that increase security, but often preferred simpler procedures. The most notable differences were linked to trust in the election administration. This makes it possible to treat the trade-off between accessibility and security not merely as a technical question but as a matter of political trust and the legitimation of the electoral procedure.

The third strand covers the institutionalization of internet voting and its security constraints. Early comparative studies of Estonia (Alvarez, Hall, & Trechsel, 2009), further analysis of the diffusion of the technology (Vassil et al., 2016), and data from eleven elections held between 2005 and 2019 (Ehin et al., 2022) show that the mass use of i-voting resulted from a long accumulation of experience rather than a one-off technological decision. At the same time, the technical literature emphasizes the need to evaluate remote electronic voting as a system operating in an uncontrolled environment of user devices and networks (Heinl, Gölz, & Bösch, 2023), and the analysis of the Estonian system by Springall D. et al. (2014) has become one of the best-known examples of a critical security assessment.

In the Ukrainian literature, the topic covers trust in electronic technologies (Sikora, 2024; Pavshuk, 2024), the advantages and risks of their implementation (Duliba & Teremetskyi, 2024), the normative and institutional prerequisites for the digitalization of elections (Tokar-Ostapenko, 2022), and its ethical dimensions (Chaika & Tsokur, 2024). The war has brought to the fore a separate strand of research on political participation and e-democracy (Symysenko, 2025), the legal basis for post-war elections (Didenko, 2023), and remote voting for citizens abroad (Monastyrskyi, 2025). In the author's earlier work, internet voting was analyzed through the relationship between inclusive potential and security risks under martial law (Osadtsa, 2026). Burkhardt F. and Dollbaum J. (2026), comparing Ukraine, Russia, and Belarus, further show that attitudes toward digital voting depend on the broader quality of political institutions and the risk of digital technologies being used to control the electoral process.

The methodological basis consists of a combination of institutional, systemic, and comparative approaches. The institutional approach is used to analyze the role of the Central Election Commission, state bodies, digital infrastructure, and administrative mechanisms; the systemic approach is used to trace the interrelationship among voting accessibility, political participation, trust, security, and the legitimacy of results.

The comparative method is applied to compare the practices of Estonia, Switzerland, and postal and out-of-country voting in European states. Ukraine is treated as a case study whose specificity is shaped by the consequences of the war, large-scale internal and external population displacement, the partial loss of electoral infrastructure, and the need to ensure the participation of citizens abroad. For the societal dimension, secondary analysis of OPORA data and other sociological research is used.

The source base also includes standards and analytical documents of the Council of Europe, IFES, International IDEA, and OSCE/ODIHR devoted to electronic voting, special voting arrangements, elections under crisis conditions, and the use of information and communication technologies (Council of Europe, 2017; International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2020; International IDEA, 2022; Barrat et al., 2023; Barrat i Esteve, 2025; OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2024).

Elements of scenario analysis are also applied separately to compare possible options for the post-war adaptation of Ukraine's electoral process to the territorial dispersion of the electorate – from expanding traditional voting abroad to combined models involving postal voting and the phased testing of internet voting. The scenarios are assessed against common criteria: accessibility of political participation, institutional trust, guarantees of ballot secrecy, administrative complexity, security, and the potential impact on the legitimacy of results.

Selection of previously unresolved parts of the problem to which the article is devoted. Existing research provides fairly thorough coverage of individual components of the problem – turnout, trust, the design of postal and internet voting, technical security, and legal prerequisites. At the same time, insufficient attention has been paid to remote voting specifically as a political and institutional element of the post-war transformation of Ukraine's electoral process – one that requires the simultaneous consideration of the electorate's territorial dispersion, alternative modes of voting, public trust, and the legitimacy of the first post-war elections.

Against this background, the study addresses this research gap by examining remote voting not merely as a technological or organizational means of exercising the right to vote, but as a potential instrument for the institutional adaptation of Ukraine's electoral process to the structural consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war. Unlike approaches focused predominantly on the technical characteristics of internet voting, its cybersecurity, or its regulatory prerequisites, remote forms of voting are analyzed through the interrelationship of political participation, territorial accessibility, institutional trust, and the legitimacy of the post-war electoral process.

The scientific novelty of the study lies in treating postal and internet voting as alternative, but not interchangeable, models of remote participation whose political acceptability depends on the specific conditions of their application. Particular attention is paid to the territorial dispersion of the Ukrainian electorate, the state of electoral infrastructure, and citizens' readiness to use digital tools for interaction with the state. The author's approach combines international experience, Ukrainian sociological data, and current election-administration practices to assess possible scenarios of post-war adaptation. In this context, remote voting is regarded not as a self-sufficient digital innovation, but as one of the possible components of a broader transformation of political participation and election administration.

Formulation of the goals of the article, presentation of the main research material with full substantiation of scientific results. The research question, therefore, is not the abstract technical feasibility of remote voting but rather what place its various forms may occupy in the model of the first post-war elections, and under what conditions they would expand political participation without a disproportionate decline in trust and legitimacy. The aim of the study is to analyze remote voting as a potential element of the post-war transformation of Ukraine's electoral process and to identify the political and institutional prerequisites for its possible application. To this end, the article analyzes the consequences of the war for access to elections, international practices, the role of institutional trust, and possible scenarios for integrating remote procedures into the post-war electoral process.

The post-war transformation of Ukraine's electoral process will require revisiting the established approach in which the main form of exercising the right to vote is in-person voting at a polling station territorially tied to the citizen's registered voting address. According to a nationwide OPORA study conducted in March–April 2026 among 2,003 respondents, 28.5% of citizens with a registered place of residence do not actually live at that address. Among those displaced after February 24, 2022, the figure reaches 76.5%, with only 44.7% of this group holding official IDP status (Civil Network OPORA, 2026a).

These data allow remote voting to be viewed more broadly than merely as a mechanism for Ukrainians abroad. A priority task is updating the State Voter Register and creating simple mechanisms for confirming a voter's actual place of voting. 77% of participants in the OPORA study expressed readiness to check or update their voter data online given an appropriate outreach from the state. The case of the Kherson region, meanwhile, demonstrates that restoring the bodies that maintain the Register, updating accumulated data, and rebuilding electoral infrastructure are interrelated tasks (Civil Network OPORA, 2026b).

Digitalization of the post-war electoral process can therefore take place at different levels. Using electronic channels to update the Register, provide information, submit applications, or verify identity is not the same as internet voting. This distinction helps avoid a false choice between fully traditional elections and voting through a digital app: electronic tools can be widely used at administrative stages while retaining the paper ballot.

The most obvious structural challenge concerns voting by citizens abroad. According to CEC Deputy Chair Serhii Dubovyk's estimate, 4–4.5 million voters may be outside Ukraine, while the existing out-of-country network includes 104 polling stations at consular institutions. At this ratio, more than 40,000 voters could potentially be assigned to a single polling station (Central Election Commission of Ukraine, 2026c). Significant distances, queues, and the limited capacity of diplomatic missions effectively raise the individual "cost" of political participation.

International experience shows that the first response to this problem need not be remote voting but rather the expansion of the network of physical polling locations. During consultations of the Ukrainian delegation in Italy in 2024, organized by International IDEA, the experience of the Peruvian community in Florence was examined: for more than 10,000 Peruvian citizens, 35 polling stations are typically set up there, including outside the diplomatic mission (Shypilova, 2024). Practical implementation requires arrangements regarding premises, staffing, registration, communication, and vote counting.

This case is important for Ukraine for two reasons. First, it demonstrates the possibility of increasing the throughput capacity of out-of-country voting without changing the method of voting itself. Second, such a model depends on cooperation with host states. Participants in the International IDEA and European Parliament dialogue on post-war voting by Ukrainians abroad likewise emphasized the need for early consultations with these states (International IDEA & European Parliament, 2023).

In this way, a first possible model of post-war adaptation can be identified – expanded in-person voting abroad. Its advantage lies in retaining a familiar procedure, traditional observation, and the paper ballot. Its drawback is high resource intensity and dependence on host states, especially in countries with a large concentration of Ukrainian citizens.

A second possible direction is postal voting. It removes the need to physically attend a polling station without converting the ballot into digital form, but it shifts part of the procedural responsibility onto the voter and the postal infrastructure. Questions arise regarding delivery deadlines, identity verification, prevention of repeat voting, guaranteeing the independence of the voter's choice, and the rejection of ballots due to formal errors.

This is precisely the aspect that allows the findings of Nyhuis D. and Münchow F. (2026) to be used as an analytical framework for Ukraine. In their experiment, signature verification, a copy of an identity document, the involvement of witnesses, or personal ballot delivery increased the perceived security of particular models but at the same time made them less attractive to part of the electorate. The witness requirement and personal ballot delivery were rated especially negatively. If a remote mechanism is created to reduce barriers to participation, excessive procedural complexity can partly negate its advantage.

A third model is internet voting, which removes the territorial factor to the greatest extent. In Estonia's 2023 parliamentary elections, 312,181 valid internet votes were counted, while 301,620 voters cast paper ballots at polling stations; the share of i-voters among all participants was 51.1% (State Electoral Office of Estonia, 2023; State Electoral Office of Estonia, n.d.). Official statistics also show that internet votes were cast from abroad from IP addresses in 100 states, illustrating the practical significance of this channel for a mobile electorate.

At the same time, Estonia's experience cannot serve as an argument for mechanical replication. I-voting has been used there since 2005, and the number of internet voters in parliamentary elections grew from 30,275 in 2007 to more than 313,000 in 2023 (State Electoral Office of Estonia, n.d.). The length of institutionalization, developed digital identification, and citizens' accumulated experience are substantial differences from the Ukrainian situation.

The Swiss case demonstrates a different logic – controlled and phased implementation. Federal rules allow e-voting only for limited parts of the electorate and subject to the principle of "security before speed"; as of 2026, the federal program covers Lucerne, Basel-Stadt, St Gallen, Graubünden, and Thurgau (Federal Chancellery, n.d.). A particularly telling incident occurred in Basel-Stadt on March 8, 2026, when 2,048 electronically cast votes could not be decrypted and counted. A subsequent review linked the problem not to the Swiss Post system but to breaches of the procedures for handling PIN-protected USB tokens; Basel-Stadt suspended the trial until the end of

2026, while St Gallen, Graubünden, and Thurgau revised their processes, introduced additional measures, and continued the trials (Federal Chancellery, 2026).

The political-science significance of this incident lies in the fact that the risks of remote voting are not limited to cryptography or external attack. An error in an administrative procedure can directly deprive part of the citizenry of the ability to have their vote counted and can undermine trust in the process. At the same time, the Swiss response – localizing the problem, external review, revising procedures, and refraining from automatically halting all trials – demonstrates a practical model of institutional risk management.

The Ukrainian context further shows that readiness for digital interaction with the state should not be equated with readiness for internet voting. According to OPORA, the Diia app is installed by 81.3% of surveyed Ukrainians in Poland, Germany, and the Czech Republic, and by 86% among those who left after the start of the full-scale invasion (Civil Network OPORA, 2026c). Among citizens not ready to update their State Voter Register data, however, the most common reasons were distrust of the state – 22.3% – and concern about the protection of personal data – 21.9% (Civil Network OPORA, 2026a).

It is therefore useful to distinguish three levels of digitalization of the post-war electoral process. The first covers informational and administrative services – checking Register data, providing information, submitting applications electronically, and communicating with election bodies. The second is digital identification and certain elements of administration. The third is the direct remote casting of a vote via the internet. A high level of societal readiness for the first level is not an automatic mandate for introducing the third.

In light of this, three scenarios can be identified for post-war Ukraine. The conservative scenario envisages retaining paper voting with a substantial expansion of the out-of-country network and the digitalization of administrative interaction. The combined scenario supplements polling-station voting with postal procedures for defined categories of citizens. The digital phased scenario envisages the further development of electronic administration and the testing of individual elements of internet voting without their immediate nationwide application.

None of these scenarios is universally optimal. The first post-war elections will carry particular significance for restoring political competition and public recognition of the resulting authorities. International IDEA emphasizes that voting by IDPs and citizens abroad will require special mechanisms on a scale unprecedented for Ukraine, and that the corresponding decisions will have long-term consequences for the structure and financing of the electoral process (International IDEA, 2022). Remote voting should therefore be assessed not by the maximum level of technological sophistication but by a given model's capacity to expand participation without a disproportionate decline in trust, ballot secrecy, and the legitimacy of results.

Research findings and prospects for further research in this area. The analysis shows that remote voting in Ukraine is best regarded not as a separate strand of technological modernization but as a component of the post-war adaptation of the electoral process. The war has changed the geography of the electorate, the scale of internal and external displacement, and the state of electoral infrastructure, so restoring elections will require combining traditional and new mechanisms of participation.

Remote voting should not be equated exclusively with internet voting. Practically feasible options include expanding the out-of-country network of polling stations, postal voting for defined categories, the digitalization of administrative interaction, and, in the longer term, the phased testing of internet voting. Data on citizens abroad and IDPs show that the search for such mechanisms is driven above all by an objective increase in the distance between the voter and traditional electoral infrastructure.

Comparative cases also show that lowering organizational barriers does not automatically guarantee greater trust. Estonia demonstrates the result of a long process of institutionalizing i-voting, while the 2026 Swiss incident confirms the importance not only of technical security but also of the quality of administrative procedures. The political task, therefore, lies in finding a balance among accessibility, security, ballot secrecy, verifiability, and institutional trust – one that does not turn the protection of elections into a new barrier to participation.

For the first post-war elections, the most well-founded approach appears to be one that prioritizes expanding accessibility without radically changing the act of voting itself: updating the State Voter Register, increasing the number of voting locations abroad, developing digital interaction services, and working out postal voting for particular groups. Internet voting is best regarded, for now, as a medium- to long-term prospect that requires testing, independent assessment, and the accumulation of public trust.

Postponing full-scale internet voting does not mean abandoning the digitalization of elections. On the contrary, the gradual use of digital tools for registration, identification, information, and communication can become a practical foundation for further remote procedures. In this sense, the Swiss principle of "security before speed" is a useful benchmark – technological modernization must be subordinated to the requirements of verifiability, trust, and political legitimacy (Federal Chancellery, n.d.).

A promising direction for further research is a representative survey of Ukrainians with an experimental comparison of specific models across parameters such as identification, level of control, vote verifiability, postal or electronic channel, independent audit, and procedural complexity. Such a design would make it possible to move from the general question of support for internet voting to an empirical determination of the electoral-system characteristics that citizens consider acceptable in the context of post-war recovery.

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ДИСТАНЦІЙНЕ ГОЛОСУВАННЯ В КОНТЕКСТІ ПІСЛЯВОЄННОЇ ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЇ ВИБОРЧОГО ПРОЦЕСУ В УКРАЇНІ

Резюме

У статті здійснено політологічний аналіз дистанційного голосування як потенційного елементу післявоєнної трансформації виборчого процесу в Україні. Актуальність дослідження зумовлена масштабним внутрішнім і зовнішнім переміщенням населення, руйнуванням виборчої інфраструктури та необхідністю забезпечення рівного доступу громадян до перших виборів після припинення або скасування воєнного стану. Метою дослідження є визначення політичних та інституційних умов застосування дистанційних форм голосування з урахуванням вимог доступності, довіри, таємності голосування та легітимності результатів. Методологічну основу становлять інституційний, системний і порівняльний підходи, кейс-стаді України, вторинний аналіз соціологічних даних та елементи сценарного аналізу. На основі досвіду Естонії, Швейцарії, голосування громадян за кордоном в Італії та українських емпіричних даних визначено три сценарії післявоєнної адаптації виборчого процесу: консервативний, комбінований та поетапний цифровий. Обґрунтовано, що для проведення перших післявоєнних виборів пріоритет має надаватися розширенню доступності без радикальної зміни самої процедури голосування, тоді як інтернет-голосування доцільно розглядати як середньо- та довгострокову перспективу. Дослідження підкреслює, що дистанційне голосування слід розглядати як складову ширшої інституційної адаптації адміністрування виборів до територіальної дисперсії українського

електорату, а не лише як суто технологічну інновацію. Особливу увагу приділено розмежуванню поштового та інтернет-голосування, а також можливості поєднання механізмів дистанційної участі зі збереженням усталених гарантій чесності та доброчесності виборчого процесу. Отримані результати створюють основу для оцінювання альтернативних моделей післявоєнної адаптації виборчого процесу та розроблення поетапного підходу до цифрової трансформації виборчого процесу України.

Ключові слова: дистанційне голосування, інтернет-голосування, виборчий процес, довіра, Україна.

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