UDC 327.8:004.8:341.217
DOI https://doi.org/10.32782/2707-5206.2026.42.19

Vinnykova N. A.
Doctor of Political Sciences, Head,
Department International Relations,
V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University
Maidan Svobody, 4, Kharkiv, 61022, Ukraine
E-mail: vinnykova@karazin.ua
ORCID ID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5941-7562

INSTITUTIONAL GRIDLOCK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN GLOBAL AI GOVERNANCE AND THE RISE OF «TECHPLOMACY»

The rapid advancement and strategic deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies have introduced systemic challenges to the traditional architecture of international relations. This article provides a comprehensive institutional and geopolitical analysis of global AI governance fragmentation, focusing on the structural reasons why traditional international organizations (IOs) fail to effectively regulate general-purpose technologies and transnational technology corporations (Big Tech). The study establishes that the core barrier to universal governance lies in the institutional paralysis of multilateral bodies – such as the United Nations, UNESCO, and the World Trade Organization – alongside a deep structural split within the United States–People's Republic of China–European Union regulatory triopoly. Beyond the primary power poles, the paper maps out a multi-tiered global matrix: institutional allies (G7/AUKUS) integrate into the US ecosystem, regional coalitions across the Global South navigate tensions between importing EU legal frameworks and avoiding Chinese technological reliance, while capital-rich states in the Gulf execute multi-vector infrastructure hedging to secure technological autonomy. Crucially, the structural asymmetry of computing power, foundational models, and data between states and tech giants has driven a paradigm shift where choosing a specific corporate tech stack operates as the functional equivalent of entering a geopolitical and security alliance. The author demonstrates that traditional multilateralism is increasingly displaced by techplomacy – a hybrid diplomatic practice that formalizes a direct state-to-corporation track and incorporates corporate diplomacy into global strategic governance. The article concludes that as global AI regulation fragments into club institutions and non-public agreements, techplomacy becomes an essential mechanism for navigating structural power shifts, safeguarding digital sovereignty, and preventing the disenfranchisement of developing nations in the emerging digital world order.
Key words: international organizations, artificial intelligence, global governance, Big Tech, fragmentation, techplomacy, digital sovereignty.

Formulation of the problem in general form, its relation to scientific or practical problems. The contemporary architecture of international relations is undergoing a profound structural shift driven by the exponential growth of artificial intelligence and the concentration of digital power within a handful of transnational technology corporations (Big Tech). The rise of the digital economy has exposed a severe institutional mismatch: traditional international organizations

© Vinnykova N. A., 2026

Стаття поширюється
на умовах ліцензії
відкритого доступу (CC BY 4.0)

(IOs), established to govern relations between states, find themselves structurally unequipped to regulate actors whose financial capitalization, infrastructural control, and societal influence transcend national borders.

The global governance of AI is currently characterized by deep fragmentation. Instead of a unified, multilateral framework under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), or the World Trade Organization (WTO), the international community is witnessing the emergence of divergent, incompatible regulatory blocs – most notably the market-driven approach of the United States, the state-centric model of the People's Republic of China, and the rights-based framework of the European Union. In this triopoly reality, traditional international organizations are increasingly reduced to moral observers rather than effective regulators.

This institutional friction creates a critical vulnerability in global stability. When technology corporations independently dictate data moderation policies, control vital satellite communication grids during interstate conflicts, or deploy generative AI models capable of destabilizing democratic elections via automated disinformation, the lack of enforceable international law becomes a direct threat to global security.

Furthermore, because the external deployment of AI tools remains highly regime-sensitive – serving as a vehicle for strategic communication in democracies, yet as a vector for narrative control and automated manipulation in authoritarian contexts – traditional diplomatic channels are increasingly subverted. Therefore, analyzing the precise structural failures of traditional IOs in the tech sector is not merely an academic exercise; it is an urgent requirement for reforming public diplomacy and developing new hybrid models of global governance.

Analysis of recent research and publications, methodological basis of the study. Recent scholarship conceptualizes global AI governance as a fragmented, polycentric regime complex rather than a unified regulatory order (Roberts et al., 2024). Comparative analyses highlight a growing «regulatory splinternet» (O'Hara et al., 2021), where competing governance models clash: the United States pursuing market-driven flexibility, China emphasizing state-led sovereignty, and the EU advancing rights-based frameworks (Bradford, 2023). The regulatory challenge is further complicated by Big Tech corporations, which operate transnationally, control critical digital infrastructure, and exploit jurisdictional gaps, thereby undermining conventional state-centric regulatory models (Murcia & Suddaby, 2024). These divergent approaches reinforce systemic fragmentation and reduce the feasibility of a unified multilateral solution. In response, recent work on technological diplomacy suggests that hybrid institutional frameworks may be necessary to bridge fragmented governance spaces and enhance institutional resilience (Bjola & Kornprobst, 2025).

This study employs a qualitative, dual-faceted methodological framework integrating comparative political analysis and institutional analysis to examine the institutional gridlock of traditional international organizations (IOs) in regulating artificial intelligence and responding to the dominance of transnational tech corporations. To map and evaluate the emerging global governance landscape, a comparative approach is applied across the primary regulatory blocs of the United States, China, and the European Union. Building upon established models of techno-geopolitical rivalry, this comparative lens evaluates these regimes along three analytical dimensions:

– regulatory enforcement mechanisms (binding statutory frameworks vs. state-directed mandates vs. market self-regulation);

– actor alignment and power distribution (public-private leverage and Big Tech autonomy);

– geopolitical reach and externalities (normative vs. technical power projection).

Complementarily, an institutional framework is utilized to identify the structural mismatches between classical multilateral architectures and the digital ecosystem, focusing on how consensus-driven IO decision-making processes fail to match the exponential cycles of AI development, while examining «techplomacy» as an emerging hybrid practice of direct state-to-corporation engagement.

Selection of previously unresolved parts of the problem to which the article is devoted. While the existing literature comprehensively documents the rise of Big Tech and the geopolitical rivalry between major powers, there remains a significant gap in analyzing the internal institutional friction within international organizations (IOs) as they attempt to navigate this dual pressure. Most studies focus either on the corporate power of Big Tech or the foreign policy of sovereign states. This article addresses this gap by examining the exact mechanisms through which international organizations are being marginalized, demonstrating how the interplay between corporate technological monopolies and regional regulatory fragmentation leaves traditional multilateralism structurally incapacitated in the global AI race.

Formulation of the goals of the article, presentation of the main research material with full substantiation of scientific results. The research aims to evaluate the regulatory capacity and structural limitations of international organizations in global AI governance amid the institutional gridlock caused by the growing influence of transnational tech corporations and geopolitical fragmentation.

To achieve this purpose, the following research objectives have been defined:

1. To outline the trends of geopolitical fragmentation («regulatory splinternet») and the current state of state digital sovereignty.

2. To assess the structural role and systemic limits of traditional international

3. organizations in AI regulation relative to sovereign states and Big Tech corporations.

4. To substantiate the conceptual foundations of «techplomacy» (technological diplomacy) as an emerging institutional framework for direct state-to-corporation engagement in response to the failure of classical multilateralism**.**

The international digital order has crystallized into an asymmetrical triopoly driven by the United States, China, and the European Union, where artificial intelligence (AI) serves as a determinant of geopolitical dominance. Each pole projects a distinct governance model: the US advances market-driven innovation; China implements state-led infrastructural dependency via the Digital Silk Road and critical supply chain monopolies (see Vinnykova 2025, p. 179); while the EU exercises normative power through the EU AI Act (Regulation (EU) 2024/1689). This structural divergence manifests across three primary axes of systemic friction:

1. Technological dimension (capacity and infrastructure). Structural confrontation between the US and China over physical digital infrastructure (undersea cables, 5G/6G) and semiconductor supply chains (such as Advanced Semiconductor Materials Lithography [ASML] and Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company [TSMC]).

Mutual export controls on advanced Graphics Processing Units (GPUs) and rare earth elements drive global technological bifurcation.

1. Geopolitical dimension (strategic priorities). Transatlantic and cross-regional divergence in external AI strategies, visible in the friction between US market-driven expansionism, Chinese state-led infrastructural dependency, and EU regulatory containment.

3. Value-based dimension (ideological positioning). Ideological opposition between human-centric AI models protecting fundamental rights (e.g. EU, US) and authoritarian models of technologically mediated social control and algorithmic surveillance (China).

Beyond the primary triopoly core, the structural gravity of US–China–EU rivalry reshapes the broader digital landscape, forcing third states to continuously maneuver between techno-hegemonic pressures, resource dependencies, and regulatory mandates along a multi-tiered global matrix. Institutional allies, such as Canada, Japan, Australia, are integrated into transatlantic and transpacific security frameworks (AUKUS, QUAD, G7), align with the US technology stack while leveraging niche strategic assets – such as semiconductor reindustrialization, critical mineral supply chains, and foundational research – to reinforce Western technological cohesion.

Gulf states (e.g., Saudi Arabia, UAE), leveraging sovereign wealth funds, cheap energy, and strategic geography, execute multi-vector infrastructure hedging to establish autonomous compute hubs (e.g., the Falcon LLM series). When confronted with US export controls, regional entities (such as Group 42) strategically realign from Chinese suppliers toward Western infrastructure to balance GPU access with national technological autonomy.

The Global South (Latin America and Africa), operating as the principal battleground for regulatory and infrastructural influence, exhibit hybrid alignment strategies. Developing economies often import EU-style privacy frameworks and US cloud infrastructure while simultaneously relying on cost-effective Chinese hardware for 5G telecommunications, prompting an emerging movement for data localization to counter «digital neocolonialism» (Kwet, 2019).

Consequently, strategic alignment in the international system is no longer defined solely by formal diplomatic treaties, but by a state's integration into a specific sovereign technology stack – spanning hardware, cloud infrastructure, and foundational models. Selecting a primary tech stack effectively operates as the functional equivalent of entering a geopolitical and security alliance, anchoring the state into the technological and regulatory orbit of its chosen pole.

Driven by core triopoly friction and a fundamental mismatch between consensus-based statecraft and corporate compute concentration, classical multilateral institutions face a systemic paralysis that renders them structurally incapable of governing rapidly evolving AI technologies.

In the standards arena, represented by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Organization for Standardization / International Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC), China leverages its China Standards 2035 initiative to embed state-centric architectures into global 5G/6G and AI frameworks. A key example was «New IP» proposal within the ITU-T Focus Group on Network 2030, which sought to reshape core internet protocols (Komaitis, 2025). Although

this proposal failed to achieve consensus and was not adopted as an official global standard, its underlying technical specifications continue to be deployed through regional infrastructure projects, driving a quiet yet steady bifurcation of global digital standards.

In the normative arena intergovernmental consensus requirements render universal governance largely symbolic. Within the UN Global Digital Compact framework (United Nations, 2024), hard-law enforcement is systematically neutralized – the US opposes restrictions on defense algorithms, China mandates absolute digital sovereignty, and the EU struggles to export its risk-based model. Concurrently, high-standard frameworks established by UNESCO, OECD and G7 Hiroshima AI Process – lack global enforcement authority.

In the economic arena, the World Trade Organization remains paralyzed by opposing demands regarding cross-border data flows: US data liberalization, EU privacy requirements, and Chinese data protectionism.

Regional architectures display equal fragmentation. The Council of Europe established the Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence, Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law (Council of Europe, 2024) as the first legally binding international treaty in this domain, yet its scope excludes non-signatory autocracies and private compute supply chains. Pragmatic regional decision-makers further diverge: the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) prioritizes flexible, business-friendly guidelines to attract Big Tech capital, whereas the African Union advances a Continental AI Strategy (African Union, 2024) centered on data sovereignty, despite remaining structurally reliant on foreign computing infrastructure.

The structural impasse of classical multilateralism has accelerated the privatization of global AI governance, driven by a profound asymmetry of compute resources, expertise, and infrastructure control between sovereign states and transnational tech giants (such as Microsoft, OpenAI, Alphabet, Meta, Nvidia, and Baidu). As Big Tech corporations consolidate control over foundational models and semiconductor supply chains, traditional international organizations face an unprecedented deficit of regulatory sovereignty, resulting in the steady displacement of public multilateralism by corporate-driven technical standards and non-public state-corporate bargains.

To adapt to this governance deficit, the international system has institutionalized a novel diplomatic paradigm: «techplomacy» (technological diplomacy) – a hybrid framework that integrates transnational tech corporations directly into global strategic governance. Initially launched by Denmark in 2017 through the appointment of a dedicated technology ambassador to Silicon Valley, techplomacy rests upon the formal recognition of Big Tech firms as de facto sovereign actors projecting geopolitical power comparable to medium-sized states (Engtoft Meldgaard & Fletcher, 2024).

Over the past several years, this Danish precedent has triggered a broader institutionalization across sovereign states and supranational entities, exemplified by the opening of the EU Office in San Francisco in 2022 to negotiate directly with tech executives, as well as specialized tech envoy mandates within the foreign ministries of France, the Netherlands, the UK, Estonia, Australia, and Brazil. Operating along a dual-vector framework – encompassing both state foreign policy and corporate

strategy – techplomacy formalizes a direct state-to-corporation track in modern international relations.

However, a profound global representation gap persists. According to the Global Tech Diplomacy Report, while approximately 20 of the UN member states have appointed Tech Ambassadors or created dedicated institutional mandates, over 170 countries still lack formal representation in tech diplomacy (Aoki et al., 2026, p. 11).

This structural inequality is further compounded by extreme regulatory fragmentation: the simultaneous operation of over 140 data protection laws, 60 AI governance frameworks, and 40 national cryptocurrency schemes significantly elevates compliance costs and diminishes the international community's capacity to mitigate systemic technological risks (Aoki et al., 2026, p. 11).

Conversely, on the corporate vector, Big Tech platforms have institutionalized sophisticated internal diplomacy apparatuses – exemplified by Microsoft's Technology and Corporate Responsibility unit, led by its President and Vice Chair, and Meta's Global Affairs department. Backed by multi-million-dollar government-relations budgets, these corporate diplomatic corps engage directly in G7 margins, OECD panels, and UN working groups, acting as peer negotiators rather than passive subjects of international law. This structural transformation is instantiated by direct bilateral agreements between tech firms and sovereign governments, as well as dedicated representations like the EU Office in San Francisco. Ultimately, while techplomacy offers operational agility in managing technological risks, its reliance on non-public state-corporate bargains systematically marginalizes classical multilateralism, leaving developing nations without dedicated techplomacy channels at risk of complete disenfranchisement from the emerging digital world order.

Research findings and prospects for further research in this area. This study demonstrates that the global order is undergoing a profound structural transformation driven by the systemic crisis of classical multilateralism and the rising geopolitical subjectivity of Big Tech corporations. Paralyzed by US–China–EU triopoly friction and consensus deadlocks, universal international organizations are increasingly displaced by an asymmetrical, multi-tiered digital architecture. Outside the primary triopoly core, third states manoeuvre between techno-hegemonic pressures through distinct structural models – ranging from full technology stack alignment and multi-vector infrastructure hedging to hybrid regulatory strategies. Crucially, the profound asymmetry of compute, data, and expertise between states and technology giants has institutionalized techplomacy – a direct state-to-corporation diplomatic track predicated on the recognition of Big Tech firms as de facto geopolitical actors. As technology governance shifts toward non-public state-corporate bargains, selecting a corporate tech stack has become the functional equivalent of entering a binding security alliance. Consequently, the emerging digital order threatens to deepen structural inequalities, risking complete disenfranchisement for developing nations lacking dedicated techplomacy machinery.

Future research should focus on developing institutional metrics for assessing the efficacy of techplomacy models, analyzing the legal mechanisms for integrating non-state tech entities into international public law, and evaluating strategies for developing economies to build algorithmic and data sovereignty within a bifurcated global digital stack.

References [Список використаної літератури]

African Union. (2024). *Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy*. African Union Commission [in English]. [Continental Artificial Intelligence Strategy. African Union Commission. 2024. URL: https://au.int/en/documents/20240809/continental-artificial-intelligence-strategy (date of access: 01.08.2026).]

Aoki, A. M., Al Feghali, S., & Garcia, E. (2026). *The Global Tech Diplomacy Report 2026* (Academic Insight Report). Tech Diplomacy Global Institute [in English]. [Aoki A. M., Al Feghali S., Garcia E. The Global Tech Diplomacy Report 2026. Academic Insight Report. Tech Diplomacy Global Institute, 2026. URL: https://tdgi.org/the-global-technology-diplomacy-report-2026/ (date of access: 01.08.2026).]

Bjola, C., & Kornprobst, M. (2025). Studying tech diplomacy – Introduction to the Special Issue on Tech Diplomacy. *Global Policy,* 16(1), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.70035 [in English]. [Bjola C., Kornprobst M. Studying tech diplomacy – Introduction to the Special Issue on Tech Diplomacy. Global Policy. 2025. Vol. 16, Is. 1. P. 1–8. DOI: 10.1111/1758-5899.70035.]

Bradford, A. (2023). *Digital empires: The global battle to regulate technology*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197649268.001.0001 [in English]. [Bradford A. Digital empires: The global battle to regulate technology. Oxford University Press, 2023. 384 p. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197649268.001.0001.]

Council of Europe. (2024). *Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law* (Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 225) [in English]. [Framework Convention on Artificial Intelligence and Human Rights, Democracy and the Rule of Law. Council of Europe Treaty Series No. 225. 2024. URL: https://rm.coe.int/1680afae3c (date of access: 01.08.2026).]

Engtoft Meldgaard, A. M., & Fletcher, T. (2024). Digital diplomatic representation: The rise of tech ambassadors. In C. Bjola & I. Manor (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Digital Diplomacy*. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192859198.013.23 [in English]. [Engtoft Meldgaard A. M., Fletcher T. Digital diplomatic representation: The rise of tech ambassadors. The Oxford Handbook of Digital Diplomacy / ed. by C. Bjola, I. Manor. Oxford University Press, 2024. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780192859198.013.23.]

Komaitis, K. (2025, September 5). Analysis: China's bid to rewrite the internet's DNA. *Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council* [in English]. [Komaitis K. Analysis: China's bid to rewrite the internet's DNA. Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab), Atlantic Council. 05.09.2025. URL: https://dfrlab.org/2025/09/05/analysis-chinas-bid-to-rewrite-the-internets-dna/ (date of access: 01.08.2026).]

Kwet, M. (2019). Digital colonialism: US empire and the new imperialism in the Global South. *Race & Class*, 60(4), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1177/0306396818823172 [in English]. [Kwet M. Digital colonialism: US empire and the new imperialism in the Global South. Race & Class. 2019. Vol. 60, Is. 4. P. 3–26. DOI: 10.1177/0306396818823172.]

Murcia, M. J., & Suddaby, R. (2024). A layered governance approach to regulating Big Tech. *Long Range Planning,* 57(4), Article 102453. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lrp.2024.102453 [in English]. [Murcia M. J., Suddaby R. A layered governance approach to regulating Big Tech. Long Range Planning. 2024. Vol. 57, Is. 4. Art. 102453. DOI: 10.1016/j.lrp.2024.102453.]

O'Hara, K., Hall, W., & Cerf, V. (2021). Four Internets: Data, geopolitics, and the governance of cyberspace. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780197523681.001.0001 [in English]. [O'Hara K., Hall W., Cerf V. Four Internets: Data, geopolitics, and the governance of cyberspace. Oxford University Press, 2021. 320 p. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197523681.001.0001.]

Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 laying down harmonised rules on artificial intelligence and amending Regulations (EC) No 300/2008, (EU) No 167/2013, (EU) No 168/2013, (EU) 2018/858, (EU) 2018/1139 and (EU) 2019/2144 and Directives 2014/90/EU, (EU) 2016/797 and (EU) 2020/1828 (Artificial Intelligence Act). (2024). *Official Journal of the European Union,* L, 2024/1689 [in English]. [Regulation (EU) 2024/1689 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 June 2024 (Artificial Intelligence Act). Official Journal of the European Union. 2024. L, 2024/1689.]

Roberts, H., Hine, E., Taddeo, M., & Floridi, L. (2024). Global AI governance: Barriers and pathways forward. *International Affairs,* 100(3), 1275–1286. https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiae073 [in English]. [Roberts H., Hine E., Taddeo M., Floridi L. Global AI governance: Barriers and pathways forward. International Affairs. 2024. Vol. 100, Is. 3. P. 1275–1286. DOI: 10.1093/ia/iiae073.]

Vinnykova, N. (2025). Global rivalry for Artificial Intelligence. *Politicus*, (2), 178–183 DOI https://doi.org/10.24195/2414-9616.2025-2.28 [in English]. [Vinnykova N. Global rivalry for Artificial Intelligence. Politicus. 2025. Is. 2. P. 178–183. DOI https://doi.org/10.24195/2414-9616.2025-2.28] зазначити DOI

United Nations. (2024). *Global Digital Compact* (Annex III to the Pact for the Future, Resolution A/RES/79/1). United Nations General Assembly [in English]. [Global Digital Compact. Resolution A/RES/79/1, Annex III. United Nations General Assembly, 2024. URL: https://www.un.org/en/summit-of-the-future/global-digital-compact (date of access: 01.08.2026).]

Н. А. Вінникова
кафедра міжнародних відносин
Харківський національний університет імені В. Н. Каразіна
майдан Свободи, 4, м. Харків, 61022, Україна

ІНСТИТУЦІЙНА ПАСТКА МІЖНАРОДНИХ ОРГАНІЗАЦІЙ У ГЛОБАЛЬНОМУ ВРЯДУВАННІ ШТУЧНИМ ІНТЕЛЕКТОМ ТА УТВЕРДЖЕННЯ ТЕХНОДИПЛОМАТІЇ

Резюме
Швидкий прогрес і стратегічне розгортання технологій штучного інтелекту (ШІ) створили системні виклики для усталеної архітектури міжнародних відносин. На основі якісної методології, що поєднує порівняльно-політичний та неоінституційний аналіз, у статті подано комплексне дослідження фрагментації глобального врядування ШІ з акцентом на структурних причинах неспроможності класичних міжнародних організацій (МО) ефективно регулювати технології загального призначення та транснаціональні технологічні корпорації (Big Tech). Установлено, що головним бар'єром на шляху до універсального врядування є інституційний параліч багатосторонніх структур (ООН, ЮНЕСКО, СОТ), що супроводжується глибоким структурним розколом усередині регуляторної триполії США – КНР – ЄС. Поза межами основних полюсів сили авторкою зафіксовано багаторівневу глобальну матрицю: інституційні союзники (G7/AUKUS) інтегруються в американську екосистему; регіональні коаліції Глобального Півдня балансують між імпортом правових норм ЄС і прагненням уникнути технологічної залежності від Китаю; а заможні країни Перської затоки реалізують багатовекторне інфраструктурне хеджування задля досягнення технологічного суверенітету. Ключовим висновком дослідження є те, що структурна асиметрія обчислювальних потужностей, базових моделей та даних між державами й техгігантами зумовила зміну парадигми, за якої вибір конкретного корпоративного технологічного стека виступає функціональним еквівалентом укладення геополітичного та безпекового союзу. Доведено, що традиційний мультилатералізм де-факто витісняється «технодипломатією» (techplomacy) – гібридною дипломатичною практикою, яка формалізує прямий трек взаємодії «держава – корпорація» та інтегрує корпоративну дипломатію в систему глобального стратегічного врядування. У статті зроблено висновок: в умовах фрагментації регулювання ШІ на «клубні» інституції та непублічні домовленості techplomacy стає критично важливим механізмом для адаптації до структурних зсувів сили, захисту цифрового суверенітету та запобігання дискримінації країн, що розвиваються, у новому цифровому світовому порядку.
Ключові слова: міжнародні організації, штучний інтелект, глобальне врядування, Big Tech, фрагментація, технодипломатія, цифровий суверенітет.

Дата першого надходження статті до видання: 11.08.2026
Дата прийняття статті до друку після рецензування: 28.09.2026
Дата публікації (оприлюднення) статті: 25.11.2026