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BETWEEN ADAPTATION AND SECURITY: SECURITIZATION AND DIASPORA IDENTITY STRATEGIES IN EUROPE

The article examines models of identity strategy formation among diaspora groups in the context of their adaptation to Europe's sociocultural space, taking into account the mechanisms of securitization and the weaponization of identity. The study is based on the premise that the identity of contemporary diasporas is a multidimensional and dynamic phenomenon shaped by the intersection of political, cultural, and social practices. Under conditions of globalization and migration, it emerges from the interaction of historical memory, cultural traditions, and the new environment in which diaspora communities live.

The article considers different types of diaspora formations, including "cataclysm diasporas," historical and new diasporas formed through economic and cultural migration, as well as first-generation and multigenerational diasporas. It identifies the specific features of their integration, interaction with host societies, and maintenance of ties with countries of origin. Particular attention is paid to a typology of cultural identity positioning, comprising five models: capsule, diffuse, hybrid, cluster, and crisis. These are treated as analytical models reflecting different approaches to preserving cultural distinctiveness, adapting to the host environment, and constructing group belonging. The article argues that the issue of minority rights in contemporary political processes extends beyond a human-rights framework, acquiring security-related, geopolitical, and instrumental dimensions. Language, education, cultural autonomy, political representation, and the preservation of group rights are matters not only of domestic state policy but also of interstate competition, transnational politics, international diplomacy, and security policy. Securitization theory is considered a framework for analyzing the mechanisms through which sociopolitical issues are transformed into security concerns. To understand the political use of securitized issues, the article applies the concept of weaponization, understood as the transformation of a constructed threat, problem, or resource into an instrument of deliberate political influence. Thus, securitization addresses how a particular group or issue is constructed as a threat, whereas weaponization explains how that threat or an associated resource is used to achieve political objectives. In this context, securitization and weaponization are understood as interrelated but analytically distinct mechanisms: the former establishes the security framing of an issue, while the latter enables its use as an instrument of political influence. An analysis of diaspora identity strategies therefore requires consideration of the interplay between cultural

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adaptation, integration, social capital, political loyalty, and the security dimensions of transnational interactions.
Key words: diaspora, ethnic minority, sociocultural space, political process, national policy, adaptation strategies, identity, identity strategies, security strategies, cultural hybridity, social capital, Europe, integration, adaptation, securitization, weaponization.

Formulation of the problem in general form, its relation to scientific or practical problems. Contemporary scholarship views identity as a complex and dynamic construct shaped by sociopolitical processes (Giddens, 1991). It is understood as a form of collective consciousness that underpins group solidarity (Putnam, 2000) and helps explain the nature of intergroup relations, collective action, and social expectations (Tajfel, 1979).

Under contemporary conditions, identity has also acquired a distinct *security dimension*. It can serve not only as a basis for social integration and collective self-organization but also as a *target of political threat construction*, a means of mobilization, and an instrument of transnational influence. In security studies, this dimension is explored through the *concept of securitization,* which explains how certain social phenomena, groups, or identity differences are constructed as threats requiring special political measures (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998; Balzacq, 2011). Accordingly, the study of diaspora identity requires attention not only to how it develops and adapts to a new sociocultural environment but also to how it is framed as a security concern, used for political purposes, and mobilized amid interstate competition.

The ways in which diaspora groups position their identities, ranging from "*cataclysm diasporas*" to communities formed through economically motivated migration, are shaped by changes in the sociopolitical landscape, the cultural and demographic composition of the population, patterns of information dissemination, the structure of communication systems, evolving perceptions of "self" and "other" within the group, and changing social practices. Identity strategies are also influenced by relations between *countries of origin* and *host countries*, migration policies, and prevailing ideas about political loyalty and social cohesion. Under certain circumstances, ethnocultural differences, cross-border ties, or continued symbolic attachment to the country of origin may be interpreted as security risks. Diaspora communities themselves may consequently become targets of suspicion, political pressure, or discriminatory labeling. Identity thus emerges as an ongoing process of reconciling one's own history with a new cultural reality, balancing nostalgia with the need for integration, and preserving collective distinctiveness while responding to the security concerns and political expectations of the host society.

Despite substantial theoretical work on diaspora identity and securitization, these fields are often examined separately. Research on diaspora identity tends to focus on cultural self-definition, adaptation, and the maintenance of collective ties, whereas securitization studies emphasize the political construction of threats and the legitimization of security measures. Less clear, however, is how specific configurations of diaspora identity interact with the processes through which identity is framed as a security concern and used for political purposes. The research problem addressed in this article is to establish the relationship between the ways group belonging is maintained and reproduced, the institutional conditions in which diaspora

communities live, and the actions of political actors who assign identity a particular security-related or instrumental significance.

Analysis of recent research and publications, methodological basis of the study

The proposed analysis draws on a range of concepts that help explain identity as a dynamic, multidimensional, and context-dependent process shaped by the interplay of social practices, cultural codes, and political perceptions. These include the *concepts of "fluid identity"* (Hall, 1990), "*local identity"* (Shao et al., 2017), the "*diaspora mentality"* (Chapparban, 2020), "*cultural hybridity"* (Bhabha, 1996), and "*social capital"* (Bourdieu, 1986; Turner, 1999).

Bringing these approaches together with the *concepts of securitization* and *weaponization* broadens the analytical perspective, making it possible to examine diaspora identity not only as an outcome of sociocultural adaptation but also as a potential target and instrument of political influence. In this context, *securitization* refers to a process through which certain group characteristics, cross-border ties, or practices of collective self-organization are portrayed as security threats. *Weaponization*, in turn, refers to the use of identity, related narratives, social networks, or constructed threats to achieve political objectives. This distinction makes it possible to analyze not only how diaspora groups define their own sense of belonging but also how external actors interpret their identities and incorporate them into strategies of political mobilization and transnational influence (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998; Balzacq, 2011; Farrell and Newman, 2019).

In this study, *securitization* is examined through three interrelated indicators. The first is the portrayal of a particular group, its practices, or its cross-border ties as a threat. The second is the public or institutional legitimization of this interpretation. The third is the justification of special political or security measures on this basis. Identity *weaponization* is understood as the deliberate use of cultural symbols, historical memory, group solidarity, or cross-border networks to achieve specific political objectives. Its key analytical indicators include an actor with a vested interest, a clearly defined objective, a mechanism of influence, and evidence that the relevant resource is being used instrumentally. This distinction helps separate the act of framing something as a security threat from the subsequent use of the resulting threat narrative or the identity-related resources associated with it.

The *concept of "fluid identity,"* which occupies a central place in poststructuralist approaches to identity, is associated with Stuart Hall's *theory of cultural identity* (Hall, 1990). Hall argued that identity is constructed through discourse, changes in response to historical, cultural, and social circumstances, and remains perpetually unfinished. This approach is particularly valuable for studying *diaspora identities* because it allows researchers to examine how they take shape in the space between cultures, at the intersection of tradition and modernity, memory and adaptation, and continue to evolve in response to changing social contexts. From a security perspective, this fluidity means that identity has no fixed political meaning. Its interpretation depends on public discourse, the political climate, and prevailing perceptions of threats. The same marker of group belonging may be regarded as a resource for cultural diversity and integration or, conversely, presented as a sign of alienation, disloyalty, or potential risk. The concept of fluid identity therefore provides a basis for analyzing changes not only in how diaspora groups

define themselves but also in how external political actors interpret their sense of belonging.

The *concept of "local identity"* helps explain how diaspora groups become embedded in specific social spaces by developing a sense of belonging to a particular place (Koch, 2019, p. 69; Shao et al., 2017). Local rootedness can foster integration, build trust, and strengthen social ties with the host society. At the same time, the significance of local identity depends on how territorial belonging, cultural autonomy, and political loyalty relate to one another. Under conditions of securitization, local cultural centres, cross-border networks, and practices aimed at preserving group distinctiveness may be interpreted not merely as forms of self-organization but also as signs of detachment from the political community of the host state. An analysis of local identity must therefore consider both the actual social practices of diaspora communities and the political frameworks through which these practices acquire a particular security-related meaning.

The *concept of "diaspora mentality"* is used to explain how groups survive and organize themselves under conditions of alienation, maintain collective memory, and preserve emotional ties to their homeland (Cohen, 2008; Chapparban, 2020). In the European context, this approach helps explain how a strong and enduring sense of collective identity can coexist with adaptation, as well as how diaspora groups maintain political agency and cultural autonomy. Diaspora mentality reflects distinctive patterns of collective memory, emotional attachment to the country of origin, and symbolic distance from the new environment. However, these characteristics alone do not indicate a security threat or a lack of political loyalty. They acquire security-related significance within a specific political context, when cross-border ties, symbolic solidarity, or collective memory become subjects of political interpretation. It is therefore necessary to distinguish between the actual self-organizing practices of diaspora communities and the external attribution of risks to them, while also considering how such interpretations may be used to justify restrictive measures or mobilize political support.

The c*oncept of "cultural hybridization"* is central to understanding how new identities emerge through transcultural interaction. In his 1994 work "The Location of Culture," Homi K. Bhabha, an Indian-American scholar associated with postcolonial studies, develops the *idea of hybridity* as the outcome of interactions between different cultural practices. These interactions create a *"third space",* understood as a "*zone of recoding"* in which new forms of identity, language, and symbolic systems emerge (Bhabha, 1994). In "Culture's In-Between", the author examines this *intermediate cultural space* as an environment in which dominant and marginalized practices interact, producing new meanings, symbols, and political positions (Bhabha, 2011). The *in-between space* becomes a site for creating alternative structures of identity that challenge established definitions of "self" and "other". *Cultural hybridity* has a clear political dimension because it helps explain how the renegotiation of cultural boundaries creates space for resistance by marginalized voices, particularly among postcolonial diasporas, migrants, and minorities. From a security perspective, *hybrid identities* may become vulnerable to external political instrumentalization when the coexistence of multiple cultural codes is interpreted as a contradiction or a sign of disloyalty. At the same time, *hybridity* can serve an integrative function by facilitating cultural mediation, adaptation, and the development of shared spaces of interaction.

It should therefore not automatically be equated with either a security risk or a weakening of collective belonging.

The *concept of "social capital*," developed by Pierre Bourdieu, is an important tool for analyzing the resources available to diaspora communities. In his seminal essay "The Forms of Capital", Bourdieu defines *social capital as the sum of actual and potential resources linked to membership in a durable network of more or less institutionalized relationships based on mutual acquaintance and recognition.* Social capital reflects a group's capacity to act through trust, social cohesion, and the exchange of mutual obligations (Bourdieu, 1986). In the context of *new diasporas*, this concept helps assess the mobilization of internal resources, explain mechanisms of mutual support and adaptation to a new environment, and examine how horizontal networks of trust facilitate integration without the loss of collective identity. It also makes it possible to explore how multigenerational cultural communities convert social capital into political influence and gain access to services, education, and business opportunities in their countries of residence (Bourdieu, 1986; Turner, 1999). At the same time, *social capital has a dual analytical dimension*. It can promote social integration, mutual assistance, and interest representation, but under certain conditions it may also be used for political mobilization, the dissemination of selective narratives, or influence over decisions made by state institutions. In this context, weaponization is not an inherent property of social capital itself but a possible way in which political actors deliberately use it. An analysis of diaspora networks must therefore distinguish between their everyday role in facilitating integration and situations in which social, informational, or symbolic resources become part of strategies of external influence.

Selection of previously unresolved parts of the problem to which the article is devoted

The *study of diaspora identity strategies* thus requires consideration of the interaction between sociocultural, institutional, and political factors, as well as the mechanisms through which collective identity acquires security-related significance and may be used as a resource for political influence. Of particular analytical importance is the relationship between diaspora groups' adaptation practices, the preservation of their cultural distinctiveness, and the transformation of identity under the influence of securitization and weaponization.

Formulation of the goals of the article, presentation of the main research material with full substantiation of scientific results

To achieve this ***aim***, the study pursues ***several objectives.*** These include identifying the ways in which sociocultural adaptation, integration, and the preservation of collective distinctiveness interact within diaspora groups; analyzing how the political and institutional environments of host states influence the transformation of diaspora identities; examining the analytical value of securitization and weaponization in explaining the politicization of identity, the construction of threats, and the use of cultural and memory-related narratives as instruments of influence; and exploring the relationship between cultural hybridity, social capital, political loyalty, and cross-border networks in shaping diaspora adaptation and security strategies. Accordingly, the aim of this study is to develop a conceptual and analytical account of how diaspora identity strategies emerge and change within Europe's sociocultural space, focusing on adaptation processes, securitization, and the weaponization of identity.

The study draws on conceptual analysis, typology development, and comparative case analysis. Conceptual analysis is used to distinguish between identity strategies, securitization, and weaponization. Typology development helps systematize different ways of maintaining and positioning group belonging, while comparative analysis identifies differences in the political use of identity across institutional and interstate contexts. Empirical examples are examined using a common set of analytical parameters, including the nature of identity practices, the roles of host and origin states, the ways in which threats are constructed, the presence of deliberate efforts to use identity-related resources, and the political consequences of such use. The study is conceptual and analytical in nature. The proposed models are treated as theoretical constructs that require further testing against a broader body of empirical evidence.

Diaspora Identity Strategies in the Context of Securitization and the Weaponization of Identity

To understand how *diaspora identity strategies* emerge and change, it is first necessary to examine the sociocultural environments in which collective identity is constructed, along with the factors that shape its fluidity and multidimensional nature.

In this study, the *concept of diaspora* is distinguished from that of an *ethnic minority*. A community is considered diasporic on the basis of its ties to a place of origin, collective perceptions of shared ancestry, and the maintenance of sociocultural or symbolic connections beyond that territory. An *ethnic minority*, by contrast, is defined primarily by its position within the population structure and political relations of a particular state. Although these categories may overlap, they are not synonymous. Ethnolocal and cross-border communities included in the analysis are therefore not automatically classified as diasporas. Instead, they are treated as comparative cases that help trace different ways of constructing and politically positioning collective identity.

Identity formation within *diaspora groups* takes place in a complex social and cultural in-between space characterized by dynamism, multiple layers of belonging, and the absence of clearly defined boundaries. Individuals who belong to a diaspora occupy a distinctive *liminal position* at the intersection of several cultural and social systems, giving rise to a particular form of identity. A classic interpretation of this phenomenon can be found in Robert Park's theory of the marginal man, who is compelled to live between two worlds and experiences life on the cultural, social, status-related, and political periphery. This situation can foster a distinctive mentality, reflected in the loss of established authorities, the disruption of traditional expectations and stereotypes, a tendency toward intellectualism and relativism, emotional detachment, and a more rational understanding of the self (Park, 1928).

The *social space of a diaspora* is structurally hybrid because of its interaction with a range of state and non-state actors. This space is described as glocal, combining global and local influences. It is dynamic in nature and open to political, informational, and memory-related transformations (Cohen, 2008). *The dual nature of diaspora* existence is evident in the fact that diaspora communities operate beyond the exclusive reach of nation-state influence. State control over their identities is generally weaker, making it more difficult to establish a single, standardized cultural model. This creates opportunities for geopolitical competition, information warfare, and the contestation of competing narratives of the past.

Under these conditions, the *pluralization of identity strategies* and internal tensions surrounding identity are natural processes. Some diasporas gravitate toward stable, collective forms of belonging and solidarity, expressed through ethnic organizations, hometown associations, and religious communities. Others adopt intermediate, behavioural, or affiliative identities shaped by individual experience, pragmatic goals such as economic stability, security, and mobility, and a flexible approach to questions of national belonging.

A distinctive feature of these identities is their emotional and affective nature. Nostalgia for the homeland and emotional attachment to the culture of origin may coexist with a sense of distance, rational self-understanding, and adaptive behaviour. In many cases, this is accompanied by pressure to adopt externally imposed identities promoted by host states through education policy, information channels, and official commemorative practices. Nevertheless, even among second- and third-generation diaspora members, a dual cultural orientation often persists, shaping behavioural patterns, social choices, and the formation of collective memory.

Ultimately, diaspora communities do not merely adapt to external circumstances. They also build strong *horizontal ties* through social niches, professional networks, hometown associations, and business activities. In this context, the concept of social capital is particularly valuable for analysis. *First,* it provides an operational framework for examining how capital can be measured, identifying actors and their resources, understanding the rules governing their interactions, and analyzing symbolic power. *Second,* it makes it possible to assess how cultural capital, including language, education, and diaspora cultural codes, social capital, expressed through networks within the social space, and symbolic capital, reflected in the group's positive public image, are redefined and institutionalized as diaspora identity takes shape. From this perspective, diaspora identity is understood as the *outcome of positional adaptation across multiple social spaces* (Bourdieu, 1986).

The changing forms of identity among diaspora groups depend on several interrelated cultural processes within their sociocultural environment, particularly integration, marginalization, fragmentation, and assimilation. These processes shape not only how diasporas interact with host societies but also how they preserve collective distinctiveness, develop political loyalty, and interpret cross-border ties. Under contemporary conditions, these dynamics are increasingly connected to security discourses in which cultural differences, ethnic affiliation, religious practices, or ties to the country of origin may be interpreted not merely as markers of group identity but also as potential sources of threat.

Among the current processes shaping identity dynamics, it is important to distinguish between those that emerge within diaspora groups and reflect their own strategies for maintaining their communities, and those that arise from the broader development of the host society's social environment. Internal drivers of identity change are associated with the group's efforts to develop functional and pragmatic forms of self-understanding that enable it to achieve several objectives. These include avoiding social marginalization and maintaining a positive self-image, facilitating integration in order to manage everyday needs, preserving the primordial foundations of identity as a source of strategic orientation, and maintaining a mediating role between the society of origin and the society of residence. In this context, the capacity to develop dual political loyalty is an important aspect of

adaptive behaviour in a multicultural environment. It may involve simultaneous attachment to the cultural heritage of the country of origin and to the political institutions of the country of residence without necessarily creating a conflict between the two.

At the same time, *dual loyalty may become a subject of political concern*, particularly during interstate conflicts, periods of geopolitical rivalry, or heightened domestic political polarization. In the *theory of securitization* developed by Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, security is understood not only as an objective condition but also as the outcome of the political construction of a threat. This occurs when a phenomenon is presented as sufficiently dangerous to justify the adoption of exceptional measures (Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, 1998). Applied to diasporas and national minorities, this approach makes it possible to examine how cultural differences, cross-border contacts, or the political sympathies of individual group members become arguments in public discourse for questioning the loyalty of an entire community. In his analysis of the *relationship between securitization and minority rights,* Paul Roe highlights the difficulty of distinguishing between the protection of collective identity and the treatment of that *identity as a security problem* (Roe, 2004). The mere existence of dual cultural belonging or cross-border ties therefore does not constitute evidence of a threat. Such ties acquire security-related significance only within a specific political and institutional context.

In turn, the host state's social environment has material and symbolic resources at its disposal and seeks to organize and regulate identity formation in ways that make social actors' behaviour more predictable and manageable. The main objectives of state policy in this context include three priorities. The first is unification and cultural consolidation, aimed at preserving the defining characteristics of the political nation and preventing disintegration. The second is to sustain centripetal social processes and reduce the potentially disruptive influence of various political actors. The third is to foster lasting political loyalty, which is regarded as one of the prerequisites for long-term security and stability. However, efforts to promote social cohesion can take different forms, ranging from inclusive integration policies that combine a shared civic identity with recognition of cultural diversity to restrictive practices that associate security with cultural homogeneity and tighter control over minorities.

It is at this intersection that the securitization of diasporas and minorities becomes a concern. Yehonatan Abramson proposes examining diaspora securitization through three discursive models. The first portrays the diaspora as a threatening actor, the second presents it as a community under threat, and the third treats it as a *resource for state security* (Abramson, 2024). This approach demonstrates that diaspora groups may be portrayed in political discourse as potential sources of risk, objects of protection, or instruments for pursuing foreign policy objectives. Accordingly, state policy toward these groups is shaped not only by the actual actions of community members but also by how government institutions and other influential actors portray their collective identity, cross-border ties, and political activity.

The situation of the *Turkish diaspora in Germany* provides an illustrative example. Public perceptions of this community are shaped by the history of labour migration, integration processes, transnational ties with Turkey, and the involvement of diaspora organizations in the political life of their country of residence. Research

indicates that these ties can become a focus of political contestation, particularly when issues in Turkish domestic politics spill over into Germany's public sphere. Debates surrounding the German Bundestag's 2016 resolution on the Armenian genocide and the election campaigns of 2017–2018 brought questions of political loyalty, national belonging, and the acceptable limits of transnational participation to the fore. At the same time, scholars have highlighted the risk of diaspora securitization, whereby ties to the country of origin are interpreted as a potential threat to the democratic order or political sovereignty of the country of residence (Çakır, 2023; Turhan and Oppermann, 2026). This case is important for the study of diaspora identity because it demonstrates that cross-border cultural and political ties can serve as a resource for civic participation while also becoming grounds for suspicion and stigmatization. The political activities of individual organizations should therefore not automatically be taken as representative of the views of the entire diaspora community.

Another example is *Hungary's policy toward ethnic Hungarians* living in neighbouring states, particularly Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine. The Hungarian state uses a range of measures to support cultural and linguistic identity, develop educational and civic institutions, and grant citizenship to people of Hungarian descent living abroad. This policy reflects an effort to maintain the symbolic unity of the nation beyond state borders and strengthen ties between the state and related ethnocultural communities. Mira Waterbury's research shows that state policies toward ethnic kin communities abroad are shaped not only by cultural affinity but also by the political interests of governing elites, domestic political competition, and conceptions of national belonging (Waterbury, 2010). This case makes it possible to examine how diaspora identity is sustained through the institutional mechanisms and political practices of the country of origin. At the same time, it demonstrates that policies supporting related communities can affect interstate relations and bring questions of citizenship, sovereignty, and minority integration to the fore. The political priorities of the country of origin do not necessarily align with the identity strategies of the minorities themselves, whose members may combine ethnocultural belonging, civic identity, and loyalty to their country of residence in different ways.

In this context, the *concept of identity weaponization* is useful as an analytical term for the deliberate use of cultural, ethnic, linguistic, or memory-related markers to achieve political, informational, or geopolitical objectives. It should not be conflated with securitization. Securitization primarily concerns the construction of a particular group or phenomenon as a threat or a security concern, whereas weaponization focuses on the instrumental use of identity to mobilize supporters, legitimize intervention, intensify polarization, or delegitimize opponents.

In her research on the coercive use of migration, Kelly Greenhill demonstrates how states may deliberately engineer, direct, or exploit population movements to exert pressure on other states (Greenhill, 2010). This concept directly addresses the instrumentalization of migration rather than providing a universal theory of identity weaponization. Nevertheless, it helps explain the broader logic through which social and cross-border ties can be turned into instruments of political influence.

Another dimension of weaponization involves the political use of collective memory. Selective accounts of historical trauma, conflict, experiences of discrimination, or perceptions of a shared past can strengthen solidarity within a diaspora community while also deepening tensions between that community and the host society. Research

on memory politics shows that historical narratives can be used to construct collective boundaries, mobilize political support, and distinguish between groups perceived as "one of us" and those regarded as "outsiders" (Zubrzycki and Woźny, 2020). In the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, researchers have examined how the Russian authorities have used interpretations of the Second World War and the rhetoric of "denazification" (Mälksoo, 2023; Feklyunina, Robertshaw, and Bilsland, 2025). This example demonstrates how historical memory can become a resource for political mobilization. However, it does not mean that preserving collective memory or cultural traditions within diaspora communities is, in itself, a form of weaponization.

Diaspora identity dynamics are therefore shaped by the interaction between internal strategies of group preservation, adaptation, and integration and the political and institutional mechanisms of the host state. Under conditions of geopolitical tension, this interaction acquires an additional security dimension. Securitization can turn cultural difference and cross-border belonging into grounds for political suspicion, whereas weaponization involves using identity and associated historical narratives as instruments of influence. At the same time, distinguishing analytically between these processes helps avoid equating diaspora distinctiveness with disloyalty and recognizes that diasporas can act not only as objects of security policy but also as independent participants in integration, civic engagement, and cross-border processes.

Group identity encompasses several dimensions. *The first* is a group's position in space, or its localization, which may serve as a marker of territorial or ethnic identity or may be treated as a secondary aspect of locality. *The second* is the group's semiotic connection to a particular space or place (topos), expressed through regional chronology and history and through recognition of the distinctive characteristics of local groups and subgroups shaped by where they live. *The third* concerns the use of space as a stereotypical marker of group identity. Such stereotypes extend beyond distinctions between "us" and "them" to include categories such as "successful" and "backward", "dependent" and "independent", or "warlike" and "peaceful". The fourth dimension is the perception of geopolitical restructuring, which may be understood either as a natural process of spatial development or as a political anomaly that disrupts established meanings and processes of social development.

Typology of Diaspora Identity Strategies: Capsule, Diffuse, Hybrid, Cluster, and Crisis Models

The proposed typology comprises *five analytical models of identity positioning*: *capsule, diffuse, hybrid, cluster, and crisis*. They differ not along a single scale but in terms of the dominant characteristics through which group belonging is reproduced. The capsule model emphasizes the preservation of cultural boundaries; the diffuse model reflects the fluidity and uncertainty of identity priorities; the hybrid model involves the combination of cultural codes and mediation between sociocultural environments; the cluster model focuses on institutional organization, network ties, and the mobilization of social capital; and the crisis model captures the restructuring of identity under the influence of persecution, forced displacement, conflict, or other disruptive circumstances. Thus, these models represent distinct analytical dimensions of identity strategies and are not mutually exclusive types of diaspora communities (see Table 1).

Table 1

Analytical Characteristics of Diaspora Identity Strategy Models

Model	Dominant characteristic	Main mechanism	Potential risk of analytical oversimplification
Capsule	Preservation of cultural boundaries	Reproduction of internal norms and institutions	Equating cultural separation with disloyalty
Diffuse	Fluidity of self-identification	Reassessment of the hierarchy of identities	Interpreting multiple identities as an absence of identity
Hybrid	Combination of cultural codes	Mediation and adaptation	Equating hybridity with a loss of belonging
Cluster	Developed networks and organizations	Mobilization of social capital	Equating self-organization with political influence
Crisis	Impact of disruptive events	Restructuring of memory, solidarity, and self-identification	Treating crisis identity as a permanent group characteristic

Source: Compiled by the author

The *capsule identity model* manifests as a deliberate form of separation from both the culture of origin and the host culture, involving efforts to develop a distinct *"sociocultural space*" while preserving the group's cultural and everyday practices and drawing on its substantial social capital. This form of identity may emerge as a means of maintaining an existing socioeconomic niche established through ethnocultural cooperation or as a protective mechanism against assimilation policies pursued by the host society.

In "The Rise of the Network Society," Manuel Castells introduced the concept of "*the space of flows*", a new social space in which group identity is no longer confined to a particular territory but is sustained through participation in global networks. This creates conditions for the existence of "*capsule communities*" that are physically isolated yet integrated into global network structures (Castells, 1996). Under this model of identity formation, particularly in societies characterized by a high degree of localization, there may be a need to institutionalize the group in order to represent its interests within the structures of neighbouring states.

The *Rusyn ethnocultural group* of the Carpathian region provides a potential example of capsule identity. For centuries, Rusyns have maintained a distinct identity within a complex borderland shaped by intersecting imperial and nationalisms. Their strategy of self-representation involves maintaining distance from dominant ethnic groups, including Ukrainians, Poles, Hungarians, Russians, and Slovaks, through cultural self-sufficiency, the intergenerational transmission of traditions, and selective institutional representation.

Divided among several states, Rusyns remain marginalized in terms of status and institutional recognition. In response to this marginalization, some Rusyn communities adopt a capsule strategy as a means of internal stabilization and protection against assimilation pressures.

Another manifestation of capsule identity can be observed in Kashubia, a region in northern Poland where the *Kashubian subethnic community* has preserved its distinctiveness. Kashubians cultivate a local identity that is differentiated from the broader Polish national narrative. During the twentieth century, this was

reflected, among other things, in the creation of a regional anthem symbolizing their cultural autonomy (Zemia Rodnô). Kashubian identity is often interpreted through Benedict Anderson's concept of the "*imagined community*", as a project sustained by intellectual and cultural circles (Anderson, 1991). Despite participating in Polish integration projects, Kashubians exhibit a strong sense of local rootedness and a relatively gradual process of integration. This is reflected in the continued existence of numerous local subgroups, including Lesoki, Morjanie, Kabatki, and Belaki. Under contemporary conditions of diaspora formation, including in Australia, the United States, and Brazil, Kashubians seek to maintain a capsule form of identity even in the context of dispersal.

The *Basques* provide a prominent example of an "advanced" form of *capsule identity*. An indigenous ethnic group in northern Spain and southwestern France, the Basques have their own language and symbolic culture, an extensive network of organizations, and a developed system of self-government within the Basque Country. Their identity has been shaped by a prolonged history of political struggle, particularly against the centralizing policies of Madrid. Even within a globalized environment, Basque communities seek to maintain distinct cultural, economic, and political boundaries.

Within Castells's conceptual framework (Castells, 1997), the Basques exemplify a cultural group that, despite its participation in global information networks, consciously maintains a localized identity through autonomous institutions, control over education and cultural policy, and the preservation of its symbolic space. Some Basques living in diaspora communities in the United States and Latin America continue to reproduce this identity through cultural centres and associations (Urla, 2012).

Thus, *capsule identity* emerges as a *multidimensional phenomenon* that can develop under conditions of geopolitical marginalization, as in the case of the Rusyns; within a subethnic cultural community, as among the Kashubians; or in a highly developed autonomous region with its own political institutions, as in the Basque Country. Despite differences in their degree of integration into state structures, these groups share an aspiration to preserve cultural, symbolic, and identity boundaries in response to assimilation pressures at both the national and global levels.

From a security perspective, the capsule model requires a distinction between the voluntary preservation of cultural boundaries and actual estrangement from the host society. Self-organization around language, education, religion, or collective memory does not, in itself, constitute sufficient evidence of securitization. The key analytical question is whether political actors interpret such practices as a threat and use that interpretation to justify restrictive measures.

The next model of collective identity to emerge under conditions of social uncertainty and polyethnic complexity is the *diffuse identity model*. It is characterized by fluid self-identification, the absence of a clearly defined group affiliation, and flexible boundaries between local, regional, religious, and ethnic identities. From a sociological perspective, this condition resembles what has been described as identity fluidity or a multilayered identity without a stable dominant component (Hall, 1996). Diffuseness may manifest itself in the predominance of regional self-awareness over local group or ethnic identity. Such flexibility and transformation in self-identification may result either from progressive marginalization and assimilation, when a group's institutional and

cultural weakness facilitates its incorporation into more powerful social formations, or from the emergence of subcultural or symbolic boundaries that enable the group to preserve a specific form of autonomy within a broader identity framework.

A prominent example of the diffuse identity model is the Pomak group (endonym: *Ahryane*), a subethnic community historically established in the region of Western Thrace, which is divided by the present-day state borders of Bulgaria, Greece, and Turkey (Eminov, 1997). The Pomaks practise Islam, a factor that has significantly influenced the structure of their identity throughout the twentieth century (Neuburger, 2004). Their identity remains a subject of political manipulation and ideological construction in all three countries. Depending on state policy, they have been identified variously as Islamized Bulgarians in Bulgaria, as part of the Muslim minority in Greece, and as descendants of Turkic or even ancient Thracian peoples in Turkey (Tsitselikis, 2012). These competing narratives of ethnocultural belonging reflect not only scholarly disagreements but also the political objectives of national governments in relation to Thrace, where Muslim minorities are regarded either as "bridges" for pursuing foreign policy objectives or as potential domestic risks (Trencsényi et al., 2007).

In 1913, the Pomaks experienced a brief period of political self-organization with the proclamation of the *Republic of Gümülcine*. This episode illustrates an attempt to explore alternative models of identification beyond the framework of nation-states. Subsequently, however, religious affiliation increasingly came to predominate over ethnic or linguistic identification, particularly under Greek and Turkish integration policies, through which the Pomaks were incorporated into broader Muslim communities.

Thus, the diffuse identity model among the Pomaks reflects not only historical transformations but also a response to external political pressure that reshapes the hierarchy of markers of belonging. Their identity remains in a state of continual, flexible negotiation among local, religious, linguistic, and regional dimensions. This makes the group an illustrative example of a dynamic and politically vulnerable identity model in transborder regions.

Another example of diffuse identity is provided by the *Lemkos,* an East Slavic ethnolocal group inhabiting the borderlands of present-day Poland, Slovakia, and Ukraine. For a long time, their self-identification has occupied an intermediate position among Ukrainian, Rusyn, Polish, and Slovak identities (Hann, 1996). After 1947, when most Lemkos were forcibly deported from their historical territories to western and northern regions of Poland, the loss of their traditional local environment intensified cultural uncertainty (Panicz, 2012). On the one hand, some Lemkos identify as part of the Ukrainian people; on the other, others maintain a Rusyn or distinct Lemko identity. This situation has provided a basis for competition between identity projects, which researchers continue to document (Magocsi, 2005). Today, Lemkos maintain cultural organizations, hold festivals, and operate their own media and schools. Nevertheless, the diffuseness of their identity is reflected in differing patterns of self-identification, sometimes even within the same family. Poland's policy of recognizing the Lemko minority separately from the Ukrainian minority further reinforces this fragmentation (Wylegała, 2014).

The diffuse model demonstrates that uncertainty or multiplicity in self-identification does not necessarily imply weak group solidarity. When national,

regional, linguistic, and religious identity projects compete, not only does a community's self-understanding change, but so does the scope for external actors to represent it as an object of political representation or influence. The key analytical issue, therefore, is the relationship between a group's internal self-identification and the categories assigned to it by state institutions and political organizations.

The next model is the *hybrid identity model*, which often emerges in complex multicultural systems. It is one of the most intricate models of collective identity, resulting from prolonged processes of cultural interaction, syncretism, and cross-cultural socialization. It also serves as an indicator of the capacity to adapt to life in an environment characterized by multiple cultural codes.

Hybrid identity is oriented toward transcultural mediation and is characterized by the combination of different cultural codes, the situational "*switching of ethnic codes,*" and cultural polymorphism. It creates the appearance of a coherent identity that, however, serves a mediating function rather than simply expressing group belonging. This type of identity enables individuals and groups to adapt simultaneously to several cultural contexts without complete assimilation, while retaining the ability to interpret and "translate" the norms of one culture into the language of another (Bhabha, 1994; Hall, 1996).

From a psychological perspective, hybrid identity provides a situationally adaptive mode of adjustment in societies experiencing crisis, reducing conflict through mediation. Its bearers often act as cultural intermediaries capable of operating through the "*androgenization*" of cultures, that is, combining elements of two or more cultural matrices in their practices (Wielgus, 2020).

A historical example of cultural androgenization is the *Phanariot elite* of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Its ruling families, including the Ypsilantis, Mavrocordatos, Mourouzis, and Sturdza, were of Greek and Moldavian backgrounds and embodied a syncretic Greek-Ottoman-Romanian culture (Roudometof, 2001). They were characterized by cultural polymorphism, flexibility, and transitivity, enabling them to act as mediators and "*translators*" within a polysemiotic system.

A comparable example is the ethnohistorical group of the Grenzers, or South Slavic frontier soldiers, who emerged in the borderlands between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires and experienced dual political loyalties. These groups developed identity-management strategies that, in situations of reputational or status conflict, allowed them to modify the parameters of intergroup comparison and orient their identity-based self-presentation toward a more favourable status.

The *hybrid identity model* also enables the situational switching of "*ethnic codes*." The *Bessarabian region* provides examples of historical forms of creolization, including Greek-Bulgarians, Moldavian Old Believers, Bulgarian-Gagauz communities, and Moldovan-Romanian communities. These subgroups demonstrate the combination of religious, linguistic, and ethnocultural dimensions within the post-Ottoman and Soviet cultural continuum (King, 2000).

Contemporary manifestations of hybridity can be observed among "*Russian Germans*," "*French Arabs*," "*British Iranians*," and "*German Turks*," as well as in the emergence of "*European Islam*." These identities have developed through migration, colonialism, and transnational identity politics (Vertovec, 2001).

In these cases, the *hybridization of identity* does not represent cultural loss. On the contrary, it expands the repertoire of social roles and behavioural patterns.

The concept of "cultural marginality" should therefore be interpreted not as a loss of belonging but as the possession of additional skills in a multicultural environment, enabling individuals to present and negotiate their affiliations rather than determining belonging itself.

Ethnic hybridization may arise as a consequence of a group's marginalization, particularly when the group is characterized by cultural polymorphism and transitivity. Such groups can act as mediators and "translators" within a polysemiotic system, adapting borrowed elements and incorporating them into new contexts.

Ultimately, *hybrid identity* is not a sign of an indistinct or weakened group identity but an adaptive strategy in a world where the boundaries between "us" and "them" are becoming increasingly blurred. In the postmodern world, such forms of hybridity are a condition for the emergence of an open social space (Appadurai, 1996).

Hybrid identity reveals the adaptive potential of cultural mediation, as the combination of different cultural codes can facilitate interaction between a community and its host society. Its political vulnerability arises not from the multiplicity of affiliations itself but from circumstances in which such multiplicity is interpreted as an incompatibility of political loyalties or exploited to mobilize conflicting perceptions of "us" and "them".

Among socially developed, structured, and well-adapted groups possessing substantial accumulated social capital, a cluster identity model may emerge. This form of identity is based not only on shared ethnocultural characteristics but also on a group's capacity to organize cooperation, develop its own communication spaces and institutions, and influence its surrounding social and political environment. From a sociological perspective, social capital is understood here as the set of actual or potential resources available to a local or translocal group. These resources include interaction networks, norms of mutual support and trust, reputational mechanisms, and cultural and symbolic instruments of mobilization. They enable such groups not only to maintain their identity but also to use it as an asset for strategic development (Putnam, 2000; Bourdieu, 1986).

Cluster identity functions simultaneously as an instrument of social cooperation, a resource for self-representation and communicative effectiveness, and a mechanism for managing identity choices, providing a basis for designing new cultural and spatial scenarios.

A distinctive feature of cluster identity is its capacity to generate institutional forms of self-organization that often operate "above" or alongside state institutions, or compensate for their dysfunctions. These may include cultural and religious networks, business associations, educational organizations, and lobbying structures operating within a transnational space.

In today's globalized world, such networks can serve as infrastructure for cultural influence. They do not merely sustain identity but also actively shape new political, economic, and symbolic realities. Through these networks, groups can influence public policy, develop alternative territorial development strategies, establish new cultural codes, and construct shared visions of the future (Castells, 1997; Portes, 1998).

Thus, *cluster identity* is not a closed ethnic or cultural formation but an open network-based model that enables communities to remain adaptable while maintaining a high degree of internal cohesion. It is an identity that actively develops and shapes space rather than merely adapting to it.

A classic example of cluster identity is provided by *Jewish communities*. Their social capital is based on a combination of religious and cultural institutions, effective self-organization through charitable foundations and solidarity networks, and an established presence in the media, business, and politics. These resources enable Jewish communities not only to preserve their identity but also to shape memory politics, maintain diplomatic channels, develop educational programmes, and influence public policy through organizations such as CRIF in France and the Central Council of Jews in Germany (Zentralrat der Juden in Deutschland).

The characteristics of *cluster identity* are also evident in highly structured contemporary diasporas, such as the Indian community in the United Kingdom, which has developed extensive business networks, media outlets, and educational and political organizations. In this case, diaspora identity is maintained not only at the cultural level through linguistic and religious institutions but also at the functional level, as a *resource for influence and representation.*

In the European context, *cluster identity* emerges through social rootedness, network development, and strategic self-organization. It enables groups to act as participants in the global political space, independently of the dominant national political framework.

The cluster model makes it possible to view social capital as a resource that can support integration, mutual assistance, interest representation, and political participation. At the same time, the existence of well-developed networks does not, in itself, demonstrate the presence of external political influence. To establish whether identity is being weaponized, it is necessary to determine whether a specific actor deliberately uses these networks to achieve a political objective and to identify the mechanism and direction of that influence.

Another identity model, the *crisis identity model*, emerges under conditions of radical political, social, or military upheaval, when a group faces circumstances requiring forced adaptability amid institutional vulnerability and the threat of disappearance.

One of the central characteristics of crisis identity is the selective activation of historical events or narratives that may yield symbolic or material benefits in a given context, such as political legitimation, avoidance of repression, or preservation of status. This process can lead to the mythologization of history, whereby actual events are reinterpreted in accordance with prevailing political circumstances or the group's security needs.

A second characteristic is a high degree of adaptability shaped by a complex historical trajectory, including displacement, changes in the sovereignty of the territory in which the group lives, repression, or assimilation pressures. Under such conditions, members of the group develop bicultural or hybrid identity models, combining ethnic memory with loyalty to the state in which they reside.

A third characteristic is polyglossia and dual political loyalty, which function as strategies for navigating different identity environments. These strategies make it possible to preserve autonomy within the symbolic sphere while remaining loyal, or outwardly demonstrating loyalty, to the dominant political structure.

Classical examples of crisis identity strategies include those adopted by *Greeks, Bulgarians, and Tatars in the Soviet Union* during and after the Second World War. In response to mass repression, forced displacement, or suspicions of disloyalty,

members of these groups sometimes concealed their ethnic affiliation by changing their surnames or avoiding the use of their languages in public. They could also demonstrate "dual loyalty" by emphasizing their patriotic allegiance while maintaining ethnocultural continuity in everyday life.

Crisis identity is not merely a reaction to a threat but a comprehensive model of adaptive behaviour. It activates memories of loss or injustice, develops strategies for survival under political pressure, and uses ethnic resources as strategic capital in negotiations with the state or international institutions.

In the contemporary world, crisis identities have become increasingly relevant in the context of war, migration, discrimination, and cultural pressure. They generate new configurations of solidarity, memory, and political mobilization, acting as catalysts for the emergence of new diaspora identities and transcultural lobbying networks.

The *crisis model* reflects not so much a stable form of cultural organization as a process of identity transformation under the influence of disruptive events. War, deportation, persecution, or forced displacement may strengthen collective solidarity and political mobilization, but the specific outcomes depend on the community's experience, the conditions of reception, and the nature of state policy. Crisis identity should therefore be analyzed as a dynamic configuration that may coexist with capsule, hybrid, or cluster practices.

All five identity models (capsule, diffuse, hybrid, cluster, and crisis) are analytical constructs that help illustrate how local and translocal communities adapt to changing social, political, and cultural environments. In practice, they never exist in a "pure" form but manifest themselves in hybrid, dynamic configurations in which elements of several models coexist.

Combined identity models depend on historical trauma and past experience, including deportation, persecution, and assimilation; the geopolitical status of the region in which a community resides; the level of institutional support or discrimination by the state; and the influence of globalization networks and digital communications.

Identity thus emerges not only as a form of cultural self-definition but also as a resource and strategy through which a community secures its symbolic survival, political presence, and social mobility. Understanding a particular identity model therefore helps explain not only who a group is but also how it acts, adapts, integrates, and transforms amid social change. Identity formation in diaspora settings is not merely a cultural or psychological process but also a political resource. Identity becomes an instrument for constructing collective memory, developing strategies of loyalty, mobilizing political support, and establishing international lobbying networks. In contemporary Europe, diaspora identity strategies extend beyond integration. They may involve the development of alternative cultural codes, practices of dual political loyalty, the formation of cluster-based networks, and the use of identity as an adaptive mechanism.

A comparison of the cases examined suggests that the political significance of diaspora identity emerges through the interaction of at least three factors: the community's internal self-organization, the policies of the host state, and the interests of the country of origin or other external actors. In the case of the Turkish diaspora in Germany, particular importance attaches to how cross-border political

ties and questions of loyalty are interpreted. In Hungary's policy toward related communities abroad, the central issue is the relationship between cultural support, political representation, and interstate relations. Russia's use of historical memory and "denazification" narratives illustrates how historical interpretations can be instrumentalized to legitimize political objectives. These cases are not identical, but together they demonstrate that the political use of identity must be analyzed with reference to the specific actor, its objectives, the mechanism of influence employed, and the resulting consequences. At the same time, the actions of a state or individual organizations must not automatically be attributed to an entire diaspora community.

Research findings and prospects for further research in this area

Diaspora identity in contemporary Europe emerges as a dynamic configuration of group belonging shaped by the interaction of sociocultural adaptation, the preservation of collective distinctiveness, internal self-organization, and the political demands of the host state. Its transformation depends not only on the internal strategies of diaspora communities but also on institutional conditions, the nature of cross-border ties, and political interpretations of group belonging and loyalty. Cultural differences and ties with the country of origin can serve as resources for integration and collective representation; however, under certain political circumstances, they may become grounds for public suspicion, security-related problematization, or deliberate political influence.

The principal research finding lies in the development of a conceptual and analytical framework that combines the typology of diaspora identity strategies with a distinction between securitization and the weaponization of identity as interconnected but analytically distinct mechanisms of political interaction. Five analytical models of identity strategies are proposed: capsule, diffuse, hybrid, cluster, and crisis. These models systematize different approaches to preserving group distinctiveness, adapting to the sociocultural environment, organizing through networks, and responding to political pressure. They are not treated as mutually exclusive types of diaspora but as overlapping analytical configurations whose relative significance varies according to historical experience, institutional environments, social capital, and patterns of interaction with host states and countries of origin. This typology provides an analytical basis for examining the conditions under which diaspora identity strategies emerge, coexist, and transform.

A further finding is that securitization and the weaponization of identity require separate analytical consideration. Securitization involves constructing a particular group, its cultural characteristics, or its cross-border ties as a threat, potentially legitimizing exceptional political and security measures. The weaponization of identity refers to the deliberate use of identity, collective memory, symbols, and cross-border networks to achieve political objectives. Distinguishing between these processes makes it possible to differentiate the political construction of a threat from the instrumental use of identity-related resources. Neither process is an automatic consequence of the existence of a diaspora; its emergence and intensity depend on the political context, interstate relations, institutional practices, and the strategies pursued by specific actors.

The comparative analysis of the Turkish diaspora in Germany and Hungary's policies toward ethnically related communities abroad demonstrates the multiple meanings of cross-border ties. Such ties can sustain cultural continuity, social

integration, and political representation while also becoming objects of interstate competition and political mobilization. Their existence alone, however, does not provide sufficient grounds for concluding that diaspora communities are disloyal or potentially dangerous. The decisive analytical factor is how these ties are politically interpreted, represented in public discourse, and used to legitimize particular policy decisions. The examination of collective memory and narratives promoted by countries of origin further highlights the need to distinguish between diaspora communities' self-identification, political intentions attributed to them by external actors, and the deliberate use of identity as an instrument of influence.

The findings contribute to a more differentiated understanding of diaspora identity in contemporary Europe by demonstrating that cultural distinctiveness, cross-border connections, and collective memory cannot be interpreted exclusively through the frameworks of integration or security. Their political significance is context-dependent and shaped by the interaction of diaspora organizations, host-state institutions, countries of origin, and broader geopolitical processes. The proposed framework thus provides a basis for comparative analysis of diaspora strategies without reducing their diversity to assumptions about loyalty, vulnerability, or external control.

The prospects for further research are associated primarily with the empirical testing and refinement of the proposed typology across a broader range of European cases. Future studies should examine whether the five analytical models adequately capture variations in diaspora identity strategies across different institutional, cultural, and political contexts and identify the conditions under which particular configurations emerge or transform. Comparative research could also investigate how the same diaspora community combines elements of several models over time, particularly in response to changes in migration and minority policies, interstate relations, and political crises. A second promising direction concerns the mechanisms linking diaspora identity strategies to securitization and the weaponization of identity. Further research should establish the conditions under which diaspora organizations, collective memory, digital communications, and transnational networks facilitate integration and political participation, become objects of security-related problematization, or are deliberately mobilized to advance the political objectives of external actors. Particular attention should be paid to the role of social media and digital platforms in shaping collective narratives, disseminating political messages, and connecting diaspora communities with institutions and audiences in their countries of origin. A third direction involves the comparative study of political discourse and institutional practices in host states and countries of origin. This would make it possible to identify discrepancies between the actual activities and self-understandings of diaspora communities and the representations of these communities constructed by political elites, security institutions, and the media. Such research could clarify how political threat perceptions emerge, how they influence public policy, and under what conditions they contribute to stigmatization, restrictions on participation, or the instrumentalization of minority-related issues in interstate relations. Longitudinal and mixed-methods research combining discourse analysis, interviews, organizational data, and comparative case studies would be particularly useful for investigating these processes.

In conclusion, diaspora identity has a dual analytical significance: it is a resource for adaptation, the preservation of cultural distinctiveness, and collective self-

organization, but under certain conditions it may become an object of securitization or an instrument of political influence. The central finding of this study is that the security implications of identity are determined not by cultural differences or cross-border ties themselves, but by the mechanisms through which they are politically interpreted and used. Distinguishing between the actual practices of diaspora communities, threats externally attributed to them, and the deliberate instrumentalization of identity-related resources provides a foundation for a more precise analysis of interactions among diasporas, host states, and countries of origin. Further empirical validation of the proposed typology and systematic investigation of the conditions connecting identity strategies with securitization and political instrumentalization will help establish its explanatory scope and limitations. This research agenda is particularly relevant to contemporary Europe, where geopolitical competition, changing minority policies, digital transnational communication, and intensifying debates over political loyalty and public security continue to reshape the relationship between diaspora identity and political power.

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МІЖ АДАПТАЦІЄЮ ТА БЕЗПЕКОЮ: СЕК'ЮРИТИЗАЦІЯ ТА СТРАТЕГІЇ ІДЕНТИЧНОСТІ ДІАСПОР У ЄВРОПІ

Резюме
У статті досліджено моделі формування ідентифікаційних стратегій діаспорних груп у контексті адаптації до соціокультурного простору Європи з урахуванням механізмів сек'юритизації та вепонізації ідентичності. Дослідження ґрунтується на положенні, що ідентичність сучасних діаспор є багатовимірним і динамічним феноменом, який формується на перетині політичних, культурних і соціальних практик. В умовах глобалізації та міграційних процесів вона постає як результат взаємодії історичної пам'яті, культурних традицій і нового середовища існування. Розглянуто типи діаспорних утворень, зокрема «діаспори катаклізму», історичні та нові діаспори, сформовані внаслідок господарсько-культурних міграційних процесів, а також однопоколінні й багатопоколінні діаспори. Визначено особливості їхньої інтеграції, взаємодії з приймаючими суспільствами та підтримання зв'язків із державами походження. Особливу увагу приділено типології моделей позиціювання культурної ідентичності, представленій п'ятьма формами: капсульною, дифузною, гібридною, кластерною та кризовою. Їх розглянуто як аналітичні моделі, що відображають різні способи збереження культурної самобутності, адаптації та конструювання групової належності.
Обґрунтовано, що проблематика прав меншин у сучасному політичному процесі виходить за межі правозахисного аналізу, набуваючи безпекового, геополітичного та інструментального вимірів. Питання мови, освіти, культурної автономії, політичного представництва та збереження групових прав є предметом не лише внутрішньої політики держав, а й міждержавної конкуренції, транснаціональної політики, міжнародної дипломатії та політики безпеки. Зазначено, що концепція сек'юритизації використовується в соціально-політичних дослідженнях для аналізу механізмів перетворення суспільно-політичних проблем на проблеми безпеки. Для розуміння політичного використання сек'юритизованої проблематики застосовано концепцію вепонізації, яку можна розглядати як перетворення сконструйованої загрози, проблеми або ресурсу на інструмент цілеспрямованого політичного впливу. Відтак, сек'юритизація відповідає на питання, як певна група або проблема конструюється як загроза, тоді як вепонізація пояснює, яким чином ця загроза або пов'язаний із нею ресурс використовується для досягнення політичних цілей. У цьому контексті сек'юритизація та вепонізація постають як взаємопов'язані, але аналітично відмінні механізми: перша формує безпекову рамку проблеми, друга забезпечує її використання як інструменту політичного впливу. Аналіз

ідентифікаційних стратегій діаспор потребує врахування взаємозв'язку культурної адаптації, інтеграції, соціального капіталу, політичної лояльності та безпекових вимірів транснаціональних взаємодій.

Ключові слова: діаспора, етнічна меншина, соціокультурний простір, культурна гібридність, соціальний капітал, політичний процес, національна політика, стратегії адаптації, ідентичність, ідентифікаційні стратегії, безпекові стратегії, Європа, інтеграція, адаптація, сек'юритизація, вепонізація.

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