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EUROPEAN UNION'S STRATEGIC RESILIENCE POLICY: DECENTRALIZATION, ENERGY AUTONOMY AND SECURITY TRANSFORMATION

The article provides a political and legal analysis of the transformation of the European Union's policy on Strategic Resilience in the context of the weaponization of economic interdependence, energy resources, critical infrastructure, technological dependencies and the activation of global geopolitical competition. This demonstrates that there has been a conceptual shift from a regulatory and economic model of integration to a model of an EU geopolitical agency in which security, defence, energy, industry, technology and territories policies are integrated into a comprehensive framework to ensure strategic autonomy, the institutional foundations of which were laid in 2016. The events of 2022 served as a catalyst for its practical implementation, significantly accelerating the transformation of the Common Security and Defence Policy and transforming strategic autonomy from a conceptual idea into a practical tool for EU geostrategic consolidation. The article traces the evolution of concepts of the EU role from the concepts of "Civilian Power" and "Normative Power" to "Principled Pragmatism" to the concepts of strategic autonomy and strategic sustainability as a new paradigm of macro-regional security. Systemic, institutional, structural-functional, comparative-political, geopolitical and geostrategic approaches constitute the methodological basis of the study, making it possible to explore the relationship between the transformation of the European security architecture, the development of energy diplomacy, lobbying and the new mechanisms of multi-level and polycentric governance. The study proceeds from an analysis of the conceptual evolution of European security to an examination of the geostrategic consolidation of energy policy and, subsequenrly, to the territorial dimension of strategic resilience based on the development of energy communities, decentralization, and polycentric governance. The article substantiates the author's concept of Managed Energy Autonomy, which integrates energy diplomacy, diversification of energy supply sources, the development of energy infrastructure, and the expansion of renewable and nuclear energy.

Key words: geopolitics, EU geostrategy, strategic autonomy, regional security, weaponization, energy security, energy diplomacy, lobbying, decentralization, Strategic Resilience Policy.

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Formulation of the problem in general form, its relation to scientific or practical problems. The intensification of geopolitical competition among major centres of power, the weaponization of energy resources, critical infrastructure, logistical routes, and technological dependencies, as well as the transformation of global energy markets, have necessitated a reassessment of traditional approaches to ensuring national and European security. The full-scale invasion of Ukraine by the Russian Federation in 2022 served as a catalyst for these processes, accelerating the European Union's (EU) shift from a model based predominantly on economic interdependence and liberal principles of market functioning towards a geopolitical model of development focused on ensuring geostrategic autonomy, resilience, and global competitiveness. Under these conditions, particular importance should be attached to examining the transformation of EU policies in the interconnected fields of security, defence, energy, industrial and technological development, territorial development, and multilevel governance, as their integration is contributing to the emergence of a new security architecture.

Historical and Theoretical Foundations of the Study. Research on strategic autonomy and the transformation of EU security policy can be broadly grouped into several interrelated strands. The first encompasses studies addressing the evolution of conceptual approaches to defining the EU's role in international relations. The theoretical foundations of this strand include F. Duchêne's concept of *Civilian Power Europe*, according to which the international influence of the European Communities was to be exercised through economic and political means (Duchêne, 1972); its limitations, as criticized by H. Bull, who emphasized the need to incorporate a military and political dimension to ensure effective geopolitical positioning (Bull, 1982); and the concept of *Normative Power Europe*, proposed by I. Manners in 2002, according to which the EU's international influence is exercised through the diffusion of norms, values, and legal standards (Manners, 2002).

The further development of this strand is associated with the work of S. Biscop, who was among the first to identify the emergence of "*principled pragmatism in the EU's geopolitical positioning*" in the 2016 European Union Global Strategy (EUGS), presented by the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, F. Mogherini. According to S. Biscop, the adoption of the 2016 EU Global Strategy marked a "*return to Realpolitik*", overcoming the "*dreamy idealism*" and "*unprincipled pragmatism*" characteristic of the overly optimistic 2003 European Security Strategy (ESS), while also defining "*a new course between isolationism and interventionism*". A key innovation of the document was the official articulation of "*Strategic Autonomy*" – highlighted in Mogherini's foreword – as one of the EU's objectives. This concept implies the EU's capacity to independently fulfil the mutual security commitments of its Member States, actively participate in the resolution of international conflicts and the protection of civilians, and act as an autonomous international security actor by strengthening partnerships, primarily with the United Nations, NATO, and states in the Indo-Pacific region. Strategic autonomy is therefore understood not as isolation from allies, but as the EU's capacity to act independently or together with partners in accordance with its own strategic interests (Biscop, 2016, pp. 1, 3).

The further development of this strand of research is related, among others, to the works of G. Fitzgerald, S. Sweeney and N. Wynn, C. Håkansson, M. Leonard and

J. Shapiro, which explore the institutional evolution of the EU Common Security and Defense Policy, the emergence and development of the concept of "*Strategic Autonomy*", the transformation of the role of the European Commission and other supranational institutions, as well as the reconceptualization of the concept of "*Normative Power*" in the context of the growing geopolitical agency and strategic autonomy of the European Union (FitzGerald, 2013; Leonard & Shapiro, 2022; Håkansson, 2021; Sweeney & Winn, 2022).

The second area of scientific research covers the study of the weaponization of economic interdependence, energy security and energy diplomacy. The theoretical foundations of the phenomenon of «*weaponization of interdependence*» (Weaponized Interdependence) were laid by G. Farrell and A. Newman, who justified the possibility of using global economic networks as a tool of geopolitical influence and coercion (Farell & Newman, 2019). Further development of this direction is related to the works of M. K. LaBelle (LaBelle, 2024), T. Boersma and S. Johnson (Boersma & Johnson, 2018), dedicated to the transformation of energy diplomacy, the transition of the EU from energy interdependence to strategic autonomy, the diversification of energy supply sources and routes, the development of LNG infrastructure, autonomous energy and small model reactors, as well as program documents of the European Commission regarding the implementation of the REPowerEU policy and strengthening energy security.

The third strand is represented by studies of *multilevel governance* (MLG) and polycentric governance. The foundations of MLG were laid by L. Hooghe and G. Marks, who substantiated the effectiveness of distributing powers among supranational, national, regional, and local levels of governance within the EU (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). The concept of *polycentric governance* was developed by V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom, who demonstrated that complex social systems can function effectively through the interaction of multiple autonomous yet interconnected centres of decision-making (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; Ostrom, 2009). Since 2022, these concepts have acquired new significance in the context of ensuring the EU's strategic resilience, developing energy communities, decentralizing energy policy, and strengthening the institutional capacity of regions and local communities. In particular, M. Koltunov, S. Pezzutto, A. Bisello, G. Lettner, A. Gitzl, V. van Sark, A. Lowen, and E. Vilczynska conducted comprehensive mapping of energy communities in Europe, proposed their classification, and analysed their development across different EU Member States (Koltunov et al., 2023). M. Bianchi, P. de Augustin-Camacho, A. Ortega, and J. Ortigosa-Rodriguez, based on an econometric analysis of 192 NUTS-2 regions, demonstrated territorial differentiation in the development of energy communities, linking their effectiveness to the quality of regional governance, the level of institutional capacity, and social capital (Bianchi et al., 2026). Similar conclusions are presented in the study by C. Perpiñá-Castillo and C. Feliu, which assesses renewable energy production in rural areas of the EU and examines the role of this territorial level in ensuring energy autonomy (Perpiñá-Castillo et al., 2024).

Thus, most existing studies examine individual aspects of the transformation of EU security, defense, energy or territory policies. However, their complex interrelationship in the context of strategic sustainability policy-making as a new EU geopolitical strategy remains insufficiently explored. Accordingly, the **aim of this study** is to provide a comprehensive political-legal analysis of the transformation

of the EU's strategic resilience policy in the context of arming energy resources and global geopolitical competition by examining the relationship between the processes of developing strategic autonomy, energy diplomacy, energy consolidation, defence-industrial development, lobbying, decentralization, and polycentric multi-level governance as additional components of the new European security architecture.

The methodological basis of the research is based on a combination of general scientific and specialized methods of political science. *The system approach* is used to analyze strategic sustainability as an integrated model combining EU security, energy, defense, technological, industrial and territorial policies. *The institutional method* is used to study the evolution of legal and organisational arrangements for the implementation of EU strategic autonomy. *The comparative policy* method makes it possible to compare national energy and security policy models in EU member states and to identify trends towards their convergence and differentiation. *Structural and functional analysis* is applied to assess the interaction between supranational, national, regional and local levels within the framework of multilevel and polycentric management. *Geopolitical and geo-economic approaches* are used to determine the impact of weaponisation, energy diplomacy, lobbying, technological and resource competition on the transformation of EU policies against the background of the emergence of a new European security architecture and the intensification of global competition.

The logic of the study goes from the analysis of the transformation of the conceptual foundations of European security to the study of institutional mechanisms for the implementation of strategic autonomy policies and their territorial dimension. *In the first chapter*, the theoretical foundations of the formation of the concept of strategic stability of the EU are substantiated and their evolution under the influence of the weaponization of economic interdependence and geopolitical competition is analyzed. *The second chapter* examines the geostrategic consolidation of the EU, the transformation of *Energy Diplomacy*, the development of *Managed Energy Autonomy*, the role of *Industry Lobbying*, the defense-industrial complex and energy security. *The third chapter* analyses the decentralisation of energy policy, the development of energy communities, and multilevel and polycentric governance as an institutional framework to ensure the strategic resilience of the EU.

The study is based on the assumption that the weaponization of energy resources, critical infrastructure, and economic interdependence has acted as a catalyst for the qualitative transformation of the EU from a regulatory and legal model of integration towards a model of geopolitical agency. The study advances the *hypothesis* that the EU's strategic consolidation is being achieved not through the classical centralization of political governance, but through the concentration of strategic decision-making, regulatory harmonization, and coordination at the supranational level, combined with the decentralization of implementation mechanisms. It is further assumed that the development of energy diplomacy, cohesion policy, energy communities, and polycentric governance should not be viewed as separate policy areas, but as interconnected instruments for shaping a new model of strategic resilience and the EU's geopolitical competitiveness.

Accordingly, the subsequent analysis follows a logic that moves from the conceptual understanding of strategic resilience to an examination of its institutional mechanisms and practical forms of implementation in the fields of EU energy and security policy.

Transformation of the European Security Architecture

The increasing number and duration of armed conflicts in recent years have prompted a reassessment of the European security system, bringing to an end the period shaped by the political and economic concept of the "*Peace Dividend*", which had prevailed since the late 1980s (Knight et al., 1996; Libby, 2025). Since 2022, the policies of European states have been reoriented towards strengthening defence capabilities, enhancing the resilience of critical infrastructure, and ensuring strategic autonomy.

Under these conditions, decentralization of governance has ceased to be regarded solely as a mechanism of territorial development and has increasingly been recognized as an instrument for enhancing the strategic resilience of states. This approach involves expanding the capacities of regional and local levels in the areas of civil protection, energy security, crisis management, and ensuring the continuity of critical infrastructure operations.

The increase in military expenditure since 2022 has prompted a reassessment of the role of multilevel relations within the EU in ensuring strategic autonomy and collective defence capabilities. Whereas prior to 2022 most European states had reduced or constrained the growth of their defence budgets in line with the "*Peace Dividend*" concept, the period since 2022 has witnessed a sharp increase in defence expenditure, accompanied by the consolidation of production capacities and the expansion of cross-border cooperation.

According to the European Parliament, the total turnover of the EU defence industry reached EUR 148 billion in 2024, representing a 60% increase compared with 2021, while defence exports amounted to EUR 48 billion. The defence industry employs approximately 500,000 people across 23 EU Member States. Leading European defence companies include France's Thales, identified as the largest, followed by Italy's Leonardo, as well as Airbus (a pan-European consortium involving companies from France, Germany, and Spain), Rheinmetall (Germany), Saab (Sweden), MBDA (a pan-European consortium involving companies from France, Italy, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Spain), Safran (France), and Naval Group (France) (European defence industry, 2026).

Overall, 20 companies headquartered in the EU ranked among the world's 100 leading defence companies, including five based in France and four in Germany. Together, these EU-based companies generated approximately USD 112 billion, or around EUR 104 billion, in defence revenues. By comparison, 48 of the world's 100 leading defence companies were based in the United States, accounting for approximately USD 334 billion in defence revenues. Lockheed Martin alone reported defence revenues of USD 68.39 billion. Five of the world's top 100 defence companies were based in China, accounting for USD 355 billion in revenues (European defence industry, 2026; Steitz & Inverardi, 2025).

According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), total defence expenditure by the 27 EU Member States increased from EUR 240 billion in 2022 to EUR 279 billion in 2023 and reached a record EUR 343 billion in 2024, representing 1.9% of the EU's aggregate GDP and a 19% increase compared with the previous year (EDA, 2025, p. 4).

According to the EDA's 2026 report, defence expenditure by the 27 EU Member States reached EUR 418 billion in 2025, a 20% increase compared with 2024. It is

projected to rise to EUR 454 billion in 2026, corresponding to 2.4% of EU GDP, compared with 2.2% in 2025. Defence investment is expected to account for 36% of total defence expenditure in 2026, while spending on defence research and development is projected to increase from EUR 17 billion in 2025, compared with EUR 13 billion in 2024, to EUR 20 billion in 2026 (EDA, 2025; EDA, 2026).

A similar trend can be observed within NATO. Whereas in 2014 only three Allies spent at least 2% of GDP on defence, by 2025 all 32 Allies had reached or exceeded this benchmark. NATO estimates indicate that defence expenditure as a share of GDP in 2025 amounted to 4.48% in Poland, 3.38% in Estonia, 3.73% in Latvia, 4.00% in Lithuania, and 3.22% in Denmark. These figures demonstrate a substantial shift in the defence priorities of European states following the beginning of Russia's full-scale aggression against Ukraine (NATO, 2025, pp. 8–9).

The increase in defence expenditure was accompanied by the launch of large-scale programmes to modernize the armed forces and develop national defence industries. In particular, in 2022 Germany established a special EUR 100 billion fund, the Sondervermögen Bundeswehr, to finance the modernization and rearmament of the Bundeswehr (EEAS, 2022, p. 9). Poland launched an extensive armed forces modernization programme and increased defence expenditure to more than 4% of GDP, while France adopted the Military Programming Law for 2024–2030, which provides for EUR 413 billion in defence expenditure over the seven-year period (EEAS, 2022, p. 9; France, 2023).

The political articulation of the EU's new security course came with the adoption in March 2022 of the *Strategic Compass for Security and Defence*, which established a new framework for the development of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) through 2030 (EEAS, 2022). The document identified four key areas for action – "Act", "Secure", "Invest", and "Partner", aimed at strengthening resilience to threats, developing defence capabilities, and deepening partnerships with NATO and other international partners. The concept of *Strategic Resilience* is addressed in the document in a comprehensive manner, encompassing the military, economic, technological, energy, and societal dimensions of security. This approach shifts European policy from a focus on responding to individual threats towards strategic management aimed at ensuring long-term resilience and the continuity of institutional functioning at different levels, including regional and local authorities, in the face of protracted external challenges (EEAS, 2022).

A priority of European defence policy has been not only to increase defence expenditure but also to coordinate defence planning and enhance the interoperability of armed forces within the EU and NATO. These measures have been established as instruments for achieving European strategic autonomy, understood as the EU's capacity to ensure its own security in the face of threats. This orientation is reflected in the Strategic Compass for Security and Defence, whose adoption S. Sweeney and N. Winn regard as *marking a new qualitative stage in the institutionalization of EU security policy*, as the document provided, for the first time, a comprehensive vision for the development of the Union's defence capabilities through 2030 and proposed mechanisms for its implementation (Sweeney & Winn, 2022; EEAS, 2022). K. Håkansson takes a similar position, arguing that *following 2022, the European Commission significantly expanded its role in shaping security policy* by combining defence, industrial, technological, and energy instruments within an integrated system

of geoeconomic governance. This, according to Håkansson, *indicates the transformation of security policy from an intergovernmental domain into a comprehensive EU policy area* (Håkansson, 2022, p. 6). Under the Commission's coordination, the European Defence Fund (EDF), with a budget of EUR 7.9 billion, was established to support joint defence development projects and cooperation within the defence-industrial sector; funding for military mobility projects within the Trans-European Transport Network was expanded; institutional cooperation with NATO was deepened; and the Directorate-General for Defence Industry and Space (DG DEFIS) was established. Although, at the initial stage, the expansion of the European Commission's powers in the defence sphere was accompanied by institutional competition with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), interaction among these structures subsequently acquired a more coordinated character. This enabled President of the European Council Charles Michel to describe 2022 as "the year of European defence and European sovereignty" (Håkansson, 2022, p. 5).

The transition towards a concept of comprehensive *strategic resilience* in the EU during 2022–2026 has taken place through interaction among the supranational level of governance, the Member States, regional authorities, and the private sector. This demonstrates the effectiveness of the *polycentric governance model* as *an institutional foundation* for implementing resource supply diversification, energy policy, and the development of a new comprehensive security architecture based on the principles of cohesion and strategic autonomy.

This transformation is associated with a change in the nature of threats. Whereas the traditional security model was oriented towards the military defence of state borders, contemporary risks are network-centric in nature and encompass the energy, cyber, information, food, transport, and technological spheres. Under these conditions, a centralized decision-making system proves insufficiently flexible, while the resilience of complex political systems such as the EU appears to depend on the capacity of regional and local institutions to respond rapidly to crises and ensure the functioning of critical infrastructure.

Conceptually, this transformation corresponds to the *theory of Multi-Level Governance* (MLG*)*, developed in the works of L. Hooghe and G. Marks, who substantiated the effectiveness of a multilevel governance model in the EU based on the distribution of competences among supranational, national, regional, and local institutions, as well as their vertical and horizontal interaction in the formulation and implementation of policy decisions (Hooghe & Marks, 2001). At the same time, these processes are consistent with the concept of *Polycentric Governance*, first proposed in 1961 by a group of researchers led by V. Ostrom and further developed by E. Ostrom in 2009 in relation to the governance of complex social problems. They demonstrated that the existence of multiple interconnected centres of decision-making enhances institutional adaptability (Ostrom, Tiebout & Warren, 1961; Ostrom, 2009).

Since 2022, these concepts have acquired a new practical dimension within the EU. Alongside the traditional distribution of governmental powers, a polycentric security architecture has been emerging, within which regional and local authorities have acquired additional functions in the areas of civil protection, ensuring the continuity of critical infrastructure operations, organizing military and humanitarian logistics, supporting the defence industry, and implementing resilience strategy measures. As a result, security is ensured not only by central state authorities but also by a network

of interacting institutions at different levels, integrated into a pan-European crisis-management system.

Thus, the role of the private sector is also being reconsidered, with critical infrastructure operators increasingly becoming integral components of national and European security. This development is reflected in *Directive (EU) 2022/2557 on the resilience of critical entities*, which expanded requirements for ensuring the resilience of critical entities in the fields of energy, transport, digital infrastructure (Directive EU 2022/2557, 2022), banking and financial market infrastructures, healthcare, and drinking water supply, as well as in *Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union* (the Network and Information Security Directive 2, or NIS2 Directive) (Directive EU 2022/2555, 2022).

The latter introduced a *new model of cybersecurity resilience* for critical infrastructure by placing responsibility for risk management on both public authorities and private operators. One of the key areas of transformation has been the development of a common European defence-industrial policy. In March 2024, the European Commission presented the *European Defence Industrial Strategy (EDIS)*, which established long-term mechanisms for the development of the defence industry, coordination of defence procurement, joint production of defence equipment, and enhancement of the EU's technological autonomy in order to reduce dependence on external suppliers (EDIS, 2024).

In the academic literature, this process is characterized as the emergence of a *geoeconomic model of development,* within which economic instruments are used to pursue strategic political and security objectives. According to M. Leonard and J. Shapiro, the EU is moving from the concept of *Normative Power Europe* towards a *Geoeconomic Actor Model* (Leonard & Shapiro, 2019). This transition has confronted states with significant changes in fiscal policy, as rising defence expenditure is accompanied by the need for investment in transport infrastructure, digital technologies, logistics networks, and the energy sector. Such investment is expected to stimulate the development of high-technology industries, while simultaneously intensifying competition among different areas of public expenditure and raising the issue of allocating financial resources between defence, social policy, climate programmes, and innovation-driven development. Against this background, the European Commission is promoting the concept of *Dual-Use Technologies*, according to which investment should simultaneously serve both civilian and defence needs (EDIS, 2024; EU, "Exporting dual-use items", 2024).

Energy Security as an Element of Strategic Resilience

Of particular importance is the interrelationship between *(re)militarization* and *energy security*. The full-scale war against Ukraine has exposed the problem of the *weaponization of energy resources* as a specific manifestation of the phenomenon of *weaponized interdependence*, conceptualized by G. Farrell and A. Newman as early as 2019 (Farrell & Newman, 2019).

According to these scholars, *asymmetric interdependence* within global networks can be transformed into an instrument of political coercion when control over critical nodes of supply is used to pursue foreign policy objectives (Farrell & Newman, 2019).

Consequently, dependence on imported energy resources can become a means of political and economic pressure, while energy independence acquires the status of a key component of security, strategic resilience, and defence capability. Therefore, the

EU is diversifying its energy supply sources, developing its internal energy market, and treating *energy security as a component of strategic autonomy*. This, in turn, entails the development of renewable energy, nuclear generation, and the hydrogen economy, the diversification of gas supply routes, and the modernization of critical infrastructure as instruments for ensuring *strategic resilience.*

The (re)militarization of Europe does not imply a return to the traditional model of military confrontation, but rather the emergence of a new security architecture in which defence, industrial, technological, and energy policies function as interconnected components of a unified system of strategic resilience. This integration has created the conditions for rethinking the role of energy as one of the elements of the EU's geopolitical autonomy, thereby shaping the transformation of its energy policy after 2022. This transformation was reflected in the European Commission's *REPowerEU Plan* of 2022, whose objective was to help reduce dependence on Russian energy resources through the diversification of energy supplies, the development of renewable energy, improvements in energy efficiency, and support for low-carbon technologies (REPowerEU Plan, 2022).

The European Commission presented the REPowerEU Plan on 18 May 2022 as a response to the disruption of European and global energy markets caused by Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Its key measures focused on energy savings, diversification of energy supplies, and the accelerated deployment of renewable energy. Although nuclear energy did not become the central element of the REPowerEU Plan, the European Commission recognized its role in maintaining the stability of the energy systems of EU Member States, particularly those in which nuclear generation constitutes a major source of electricity. A number of Member States do not produce nuclear energy, including Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Greece, Croatia, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Poland, and Portugal. At the same time, Croatia owns a 50% share of the electricity generated by the nuclear power plant in Slovenia. The highest levels of dependence on nuclear energy in 2024 were recorded in France, where nuclear power plants accounted for 67.3% of total electricity generation, and Slovakia, where the corresponding share was 61.6% (Eurostat, 2026). Nuclear generation also accounted for a substantial share of electricity production in Hungary, Bulgaria, Belgium, Finland, and Czechia, where it represented approximately 40% of national electricity generation (Eurostat, 2026). Under these conditions, maintaining the safe operation, modernization, and development of nuclear energy is regarded not only as an instrument of decarbonization but also as a factor contributing to the security, strategic autonomy, and resilience of the EU's critical infrastructure.

The adoption of Regulation (EU) 2020/852 of 18 June 2020 on the establishment of a framework to facilitate sustainable investment was also of particular importance. Under the EU Taxonomy framework, nuclear energy can, under specific conditions, qualify as an environmentally sustainable economic activity (Regulation EU, 2020). This development reflected a shift in the approach of European institutions towards the assessment of nuclear energy. Whereas earlier approaches placed greater emphasis on its potential environmental risks, following 2022 greater attention was increasingly given to ensuring continuity of energy supply, decarbonizing the economy, and reducing energy dependence. It should be noted, however, that the inclusion of specific nuclear energy activities in the EU Taxonomy was formally

established through the Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) 2022/1214 of 9 March 2022, which added certain nuclear and gas energy activities under strict conditions. The delegated act has applied since January 2023.

At the same time, EU Member States demonstrate different models of nuclear energy development. For example, France, which generated more than half of its electricity from nuclear power in 2023, announced an extensive programme for the construction of new EPR2 reactors and the modernization of existing nuclear units (France, 2023a; France, 2023b). Poland, which had no nuclear power generation for many years, adopted its first Polish Nuclear Power Programme in 2014. The programme was subsequently updated in 2020 and further revised in 2026 with the aim of implementing the national nuclear programme through 2043, with nuclear energy regarded as a component of the *country's energy sovereignty* (PAA, 2020; Program polskiej, 2026). The 2020 programme established an implementation schedule covering 2020–2043. Czechia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Hungary, Finland, and the Netherlands have likewise revised their energy strategies, providing for the continued operation of existing nuclear power plants, their modernization, or the construction of new generating units (European Commission, 2025; Eurostat, 2026).

However, some Member States have maintained a critical stance towards nuclear energy. Germany provides a prominent example. In 2023, it completed the implementation of its policy of phasing out nuclear energy – Atomausstieg, and decommissioned its last three nuclear power plants, Isar 2, Neckarwestheim 2, and Emsland, whose operation had been temporarily extended until 2023 in response to the energy crisis (Deutsche Welle, 2023; Nuclear Energy, Atomausstieg, 2026). The Federal Government had authorized the continued operation of these three plants until 15 April 2023 as a temporary measure to safeguard electricity supply during the energy crisis.

At the same time, the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2 gas pipelines in September 2022 exposed the critical vulnerability of Germany's and the EU's energy infrastructure to hybrid threats, highlighting the need to strengthen the protection of energy infrastructure and diversify energy supply sources. These developments became a catalyst for intensified political debates over the role of nuclear energy in strengthening the country's energy security and strategic resilience amid "*deindustrialization against the backdrop of an ambitious energy transition policy*" (Energiewende), as acknowledged by Federal Minister for Economic Affairs and Energy Katherina Reiche in April 2026 (Kreutzfeldt, 2026; Clean Energy Wire, 2024; Portala, 2025). In April 2026, Reiche also called for Germany to engage in Europe's nuclear revival, while ruling out a return to conventional nuclear power plants in Germany itself. For the time being, Germany's official policy of phasing out nuclear power remains unchanged. Nevertheless, on 3 August 2026, K. Reiche referred to physical attacks and pipelines in the Baltic Sea and stated that "the current crisis in the Middle East and the effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate … the vulnerability of energy markets, particularly gas markets". In her view, this situation requires Berlin to consider introducing a gas levy for consumers and businesses as a "resilience reserve" to finance the expansion of gas storage facilities, which are currently only 47% full (Welt, 3 August 2026).

At the same time, the trend towards rethinking the place of nuclear energy within the European security system is becoming increasingly evident and points to

a shift from a sectoral energy policy towards viewing energy security as an integral component of a broader security architecture. This shift entails the introduction of new technological solutions, among which *Small Modular Reactors* (SMRs) occupy a particularly important place. SMRs are increasingly regarded as a promising direction for the modernization of the European nuclear energy sector and as one of the factors contributing to the decentralization of energy systems. Unlike conventional nuclear power plants, SMRs are characterized by a smaller generating capacity (up to 300 MW), modular production, shorter construction periods, and the possibility of scaling up generating capacity. These characteristics make it possible to integrate SMRs into regional energy systems, industrial clusters, large urban agglomerations, and critical infrastructure facilities, thereby increasing the flexibility of energy systems.

The prerequisites for the development of SMRs in the EU were established within the broader *strategic agenda of decarbonizing the economy* and ensuring energy security. Key policy frameworks included the *European Green Deal,* which provides for a 55% reduction in net greenhouse gas emissions by 2030 and a 90% reduction by 2040 (The European Green Deal, 2019), the Fit for 55 package (Fit for 55, 2021), and the REPowerEU Plan (REPowerEU, 2022), which identified the transition towards low-carbon energy as one of the EU's priorities (Industrial Alliance…, 2026). In this context, SMRs have been considered a promising technology for generating low-carbon electricity and heat, supporting the development of the hydrogen economy, facilitating the future integration of low-carbon gases (primarily renewable hydrogen and biomethane), and complementing renewable energy sources (Ortiz Cebolla et al., 2022).

Throughout 2023, within the framework of the *European SMR Pre-Partnership*, established in 2021 as a form of cooperation among industrial stakeholders, technology organizations, utilities, and EU Member States and organized by the European Commission, five reports were prepared addressing SMR licensing, financing, supply-chain development, and market integration (European SMR Pre-Partnership, 2026).

The further development of this policy was supported by EU institutions and Member States. In November 2023, ministers from twelve EU countries, meeting at the *European Nuclear Energy Forum (ENEF),* called for the accelerated development of SMRs, while in December 2023 the European Parliament recognized SMRs as an instrument of the energy transition and recommended ensuring the first industrial deployment of SMRs in the early 2030s. The next step was the European Commission's decision of 6 February 2024 to establish the *European Industrial Alliance on Small Modular Reactors (SMRs),* bringing together public institutions, industry, and research organizations to coordinate the commercialization of SMR technology in Europe (Industrial Alliance…, 2026).

Researchers note that the political significance of SMR development extends beyond their technological function, as *SMRs are regarded as an instrument for decentralizing national energy systems*. Their deployment can reduce dependence on large-scale energy facilities and enable hybrid energy systems combining nuclear generation with solar, wind, hydropower, and hydrogen energy (Sam et al., 2023; Vanatta et al., 2024). Their use makes it possible to develop a *polycentric generation system* in which energy security is ensured through a network of geographically distributed electricity-generation sources. This approach is consistent with the concept of *EU strategic resilience* that has developed since 2022.

The *concept of Strategic Resilience* is also being implemented in the EU through the *transformation of the traditional model of east–west energy flows*, which had been oriented predominantly towards imports of Russian natural gas.

The key policy document shaping this process was the European Commission's 2022 REPowerEU Plan, presented with the aim of *(de)weaponization*, that is, ending the EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels by reducing gas demand, diversifying energy sources and supply routes, developing *Liquefied Natural Gas* (LNG) *infrastructure*, natural gas storage facilities, and interconnectors between EU Member States. These measures are intended to enable the rapid redistribution of energy flows between regions, increase the resilience of the energy market to external shocks, and support investment in the modernization of trans-European energy infrastructure (REPowerEU Plan, 2022).

At the same time, the implementation of the REPowerEU Plan was accompanied by debates over the influence of sectoral lobbying on the formation of EU energy policy. In particular, the European Commission established the *EU Energy Platform Industry Advisory Group (EPIAG)* to provide expert recommendations on diversifying energy imports and implementing mechanisms for joint gas procurement.

However, the non-governmental organizations *Corporate Europe Observatory* and *Food & Water Action Europe* accused the European Commission of violating the principle of balanced representation in the composition of the EPIAG, arguing that the group consisted exclusively of representatives of the oil and gas industry, while environmental organizations and other non-commercial stakeholders were excluded from participation (The Good Lobby, 2024).

Furthermore, citing the excessive influence of the EPIAG, several European legislators called for restricting the access of fossil fuel companies to EU institutions, while the Committee on Petitions of the European Parliament initiated a hearing on the influence of fossil fuel industry lobbying on EU policy following a request submitted by the "*Fossil Free Politics*" *coalition* (The Good Lobby, 2024). On the basis of these complaints, the European Ombudsman opened an inquiry into the appropriateness of the procedure used to establish the advisory group and the compliance of its composition with the principles of good governance.

According to the *Corporate Europe Observatory,* the establishment of the EPIAG provided leading European oil and gas companies with a privileged institutional channel for influencing EU policymaking in the context of the implementation of REPowerEU (Corporate Europe Observatory, 2022).

Against the backdrop of the energy crisis, leading fossil fuel companies ((Shell (United Kingdom), British Petrolium (United Kingdom), TotalEnergies (France), Eni (Italy), Equinor (Norway), and Repsol (Spain)) reported record profits.

According to *Global Witness*, the three largest European corporations alone (Shell, BP, and TotalEnergies) collectively generated more than USD 252 billion in profits since 2022, while the five largest global oil companies generated approximately USD 467 billion in profits (Global Witness, 2026).

The Decarb Initiative: Decarbonising Professional Influence, implemented in 2024 by the international non-governmental organization *The Good Lobby*, headquartered in Brussels, was the first initiative to analyse lobbying relationships between fossil fuel companies and consulting and law firms operating in the EU. It assessed the scale of lobbying services provided by such firms to the oil and gas industry, the compliance

of such activities with sustainable development objectives, and the degree of their financial dependence on fossil fuel-sector clients. The initiative also established a database and ranking of EU consulting companies according to the volume of lobbying services provided to fossil fuel companies (The Decarb Initiative, 2024).

The largest intermediaries in representing the interests of the fossil fuel sector before EU institutions were found to include the international consulting and public relations companies *Burson* (which received more than EUR 700,000 from clients including ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Equinor, and others), *FTI Consulting*, *NOVE*, *Hill & Knowlton* (now integrated into Burson), and *Rud Pedersen Public Affairs* (The Decarb Initiative, 2024). According to the study, these companies provide substantial volumes of lobbying services to oil and gas corporations, representing their interests in the EU policymaking process despite the public commitments made by many of them to support decarbonization and sustainable development objectives. In particular, *Burson* received more than EUR 700,000 from clients including ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, Equinor, and others (The Decarb Initiative, 2024).

Despite the political debates surrounding the *role of sectoral lobbying*, the practical implementation of REPowerEU demonstrated a *shift* from an *energy dependency model*, which created opportunities for the weaponization of energy resources, towards a *polycentric energy supply system*, based on the principle of "*security of supply*", the diversification of import sources and routes, and the development of interconnected energy infrastructure.

This logic shaped the modernization of the European gas transmission system. Between 2022 and 2025, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Italy, Greece, and a number of other states commissioned new floating and onshore LNG terminals, which helped compensate for the decline in imports of Russian pipeline gas (REPowerEU Plan…, 2024).

At the same time, the role of the Southern Gas Corridor, the Norwegian continental shelf, and supplies from the United States, Qatar, Algeria, and Azerbaijan increased. As a result, the geography of natural gas supplies to Europe became more diversified (REPowerEU Plan, 2024).

For example, the Southern Gas Corridor, which has been operational since 2020, transports natural gas from the Caspian region through Azerbaijan, Georgia, Türkiye, Greece, Albania, and Italy. It incorporates the South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP), the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP), and the Trans Adriatic Pipeline (TAP). Following the signing in 2022 of the Memorandum of Understanding on a Strategic Partnership in the Field of Energy between the EU and Azerbaijan, the parties agreed to expand the corridor's capacity and increase supplies of Azerbaijani natural gas to EU Member States to at least 20 billion cubic metres per year by 2027 (Memorandum, 2022; Bagirova, 2025). As a result, the corridor has become a key element in diversifying natural gas supply sources and strengthening the energy security of Southern, Central, and Southeastern Europe. At the same time, debates have emerged over the possible use of gas swap mechanisms involving the substitution of Azerbaijani gas with Russian gas, which could potentially undermine the EU's (de)weaponization policy and efforts to reduce dependence on Russia. This has been accompanied by calls for stronger controls over the origin of energy resources (Corbeau & Mitrova, 2024).

The importance of pipeline natural gas supplies from Norway has also increased. The launch of the Baltic Pipe in 2022, which connected the gas transmission

systems of Norway, Denmark, and Poland, created a new northern energy corridor approximately 900 km long, with a capacity to import up to 10 billion cubic metres of gas annually from Norway to Poland and to transport 3 billion cubic metres of gas from Poland to Denmark. The pipeline received EUR 267 million in EU funding through the Connecting Europe Facility for Energy (CEF Energy), was designated as a Project of Common Interest, and strengthened the energy security of the Baltic region and Central Europe (The Baltic Pipe, 2026).

In addition, LNG import infrastructure has developed rapidly since 2022. Since 2022, the largest suppliers of LNG to the EU, particularly to its largest LNG importers (France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium) have been the United States, Qatar, Algeria, and Nigeria (Council of the EU, 2026).

The increase in LNG imports was accompanied by the adoption by the Council of the EU of legislation banning imports of Russian LNG and pipeline gas from 18 March 2026, with transitional periods for existing contracts extending until the end of 2027, as well as by the construction of new LNG terminals in Germany, Poland, the Netherlands, Italy, Greece, and the Baltic States. These developments have increased the flexibility of the European gas market (Council of the EU, 2026). From a political perspective, the diversification of supply routes represents the formation of a new EU energy diplomacy. Whereas previously bilateral energy relations were largely determined by the economic interests of individual Member States, since 2022 the European Commission has coordinated the establishment of strategic energy partnerships with countries in the Caspian region, the Middle East, North Africa, North America, and the Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, external energy policy is increasingly becoming an integral component of the EU's common foreign and security policy. Accordingly, the academic literature emphasizes that the diversification of natural gas transportation routes is not merely an economic instrument but also a mechanism for reducing geopolitical risks.

According to Belgian expert C. Tagliapietra, the EU's contemporary energy policy forms part of the *Global Gateway strategy*, presented in 2021 with the objective of mobilizing EUR 300 billion in investments by 2027 for projects in the digital, climate, and energy sectors. The initiative was designed to provide an alternative to China's strategic global infrastructure development project under the Belt and Road Initiative (Tagliapietra, 2024, pp. 1327–1328). The creation of such an *alternative to the Chinese project* envisaged the integration of a set of infrastructure partnerships, including the *US Build Back Better World programme*, the UK Clean Green initiative, and the *EU's Global Gateway programme,* with the aim of building "more resilient links with the world" and "better positioning the EU in the global race", particularly in the competition for influence in Africa, which was identified as a key regional priority and beneficiary of the EU investment package.

By 2027, the *Great Green Wall initiative* in Africa was envisaged to strengthen *Resilience to Climate Change* in the Sahel region, enhance energy security, increase renewable energy production, and address other security-related challenges in the region. Thus, since 2021, EU energy policy has increasingly become a form of energy diplomacy, as it has been oriented not only towards energy-related objectives but also towards achieving geopolitical advantages in the competition for the Global South. As C. Tagliapietra notes, "Global Gateway seeks to cement Europe's role as Africa's long-standing partner" (Tagliapietra, 2024, p. 1335).

T. Boersma and S. Johnson take a similar position in their analysis of changes in the global energy landscape and their potential implications for foreign policy. The authors emphasize that "diplomatic objectives tend to prevail over energy market realities", creating tensions with the logic of liberalized economic systems and making politically motivated diversification projects difficult to implement (Boersma & Johnson, 2018, p. 5). Therefore, according to the authors, energy issues should not be considered in isolation but rather as part of a broader diplomatic process, which they define through the concept of energy diplomacy (Boersma & Johnson, 2018, pp. 6–7). T. Boersma and S. Johnson further argue that the geopolitical objectives of *EU energy diplomacy* could not for a long time be fully realized because investment decisions were determined by market actors rather than political institutions (Boersma & Johnson, 2018, p. 16). Accordingly, only after 2022 did the security crisis and the policy of strategic resilience create the conditions for the EU to move from a predominantly market-driven logic of energy-sector development towards energy diplomacy aimed at reducing the weaponization of energy by authoritarian states (Boersma & Johnson, 2018, p. 18).

Accordingly, since 2022, the EU has effectively brought to an end the era of "*Energy Interdependence*" with the Russian Federation and has moved towards a model that can be characterized as "*Managed Energy Autonomy*" (LaBelle, 2024). This model combines the principles of energy sovereignty, energy solidarity, and strategic autonomy and is oriented not only towards ensuring security of supply but also towards pursuing the broader geostrategic interests of the European Union as a consolidated geopolitical actor.

Unlike the previous period, since 2022 the political logic of ensuring geostrategic resilience has increasingly prevailed over market considerations in shaping EU energy policy. Whereas geostrategic consolidation has provided the external dimension of EU energy security through the diversification of imports and the development of a new energy diplomacy, the internal dimension of this transformation is being realized through the decentralization of energy systems. It is precisely the combination of external geostrategy and internal territorial resilience that shapes the contemporary model of Managed Energy Autonomy in the European Union.

Energy Decentralization and the Regional Dimension of the Strategic Resilience of the European Union

Geostrategic consolidation and Managed Energy Autonomy within the EU do not imply a return to a centralized system of governance. On the contrary, they are being implemented through deeper decentralization of energy governance, which is regarded as one of the key mechanisms for ensuring geostrategic resilience. This process is accompanied by an enhanced role for regional and local levels of governance. Whereas the traditional model of energy security was based predominantly on the centralized generation and distribution of energy resources, contemporary EU policy is oriented towards a territorially distributed generation system in which regional authorities, municipalities, territorial communities, and local energy cooperatives become active actors. The capacity of the EU political system, as well as that of the political systems of individual EU Member States, is increasingly linked to the institutional capacity of local and regional levels of governance to ensure the continuous functioning of critical infrastructure.

The institutional foundation of this process was established by the *Clean Energy for All Europeans legislative package,* as well as the *Renewable Energy Directive (RED*

II, RED III) and the *Internal Electricity Market Directive.* These acts provided local self-government authorities with legal opportunities to participate directly in the generation, distribution, storage, and collective use of electricity (Clean Energy, 2019; Directive EU 2018/2001, 2018; Directive EU 2023/2413, 2023; Directive EU 2019/944, 2019). Unlike the previous model, local authorities are *no longer merely consumers of energy resources* but have become *active participants in shaping local energy policy*.

EU legislation distinguishes between two types of energy communities: (1) *Citizen Energy Communities,* whose legal status is defined by the Internal Electricity Market Directive, and (2) *Renewable Energy Communities*, provided for by the Renewable Energy Directive.

Although both models are based on the voluntary participation of citizens, local authorities, small and medium-sized enterprises, and other local actors, *Renewable Energy Communities* have a clearly defined territorial character and operate within local communities, whereas *Citizen Energy Communities* are not subject to the same geographical limitation. Such communities may be established in various organizational and legal forms, including cooperatives, small and medium-sized enterprises, partnerships, non-profit organizations, or other legal entities. In practice, however, cooperatives and non-profit models remain the most widespread (Koltunov et al., 2023, p. 3).

According to the *European Commission's Joint Research Centre* (JRC), the development of energy communities is constrained by the insufficient systematization of information on their number, geographical distribution, economic performance, and growth potential. A similar position is taken by the *European Federation of Citizen Energy Cooperatives (REScoop.eu)*, which emphasizes the need to establish a unified system for monitoring energy communities across the EU. According to its estimates, approximately 1,900 energy communities operate in EU countries, although this figure may account for only half of the existing associations, indicating both the rapid spread of decentralized models of energy governance and, at the same time, shortcomings in the system for registering and monitoring them (Koltunov et al., 2023, p. 3).

In 2023, the authors of the comprehensive study "*Mapping of Energy Communities in Europe: Status Quo and Review of Existing Classifications"* identified almost 4,000 (3,931) energy communities, bringing together approximately 900,000 members, with an average of 844 members per energy community (Koltunov et al., 2023, pp. 18, 22). Germany, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the United Kingdom are the leading countries in the development of this movement. At the same time, models of energy-community operation differ depending on the dominant renewable energy sources, organizational structure, and level of sectoral development in individual countries. In the Alpine countries, hydropower and biomass predominate; in Germany, Spain, and France, solar energy is dominant; in the Netherlands and Denmark, wind energy prevails; while combined models are widespread in the United Kingdom. In all countries with a developed energy-community sector, national and regional associations of energy communities have been established to coordinate their activities and represent their interests.

A study by the Smart Cities Marketplace, prepared with the support of the European Commission on the basis of interviews with 44 local government authorities in Belgium, Germany, Spain, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Croatia, and

Cyprus, demonstrated that municipalities are key coordinators in the establishment of energy communities. They prepare projects, facilitate access to financing from EU funds, provide municipal land and facilities for the installation of power-generation facilities, and integrate local energy projects into regional development programmes. The study demonstrated that, even in countries with different models of local self-government, the majority of municipalities regard the development of energy communities as one of their development priorities (Smart Cities Marketplace, 2024).

At the same time, a study by M. Bianchi, P. de Agustín-Camacho, A. Eguskiza Ortega, and J. Ortigosa Rodríguez, published in 2026, demonstrated substantial territorial differentiation in the effectiveness of energy-community development across the EU (Bianchi et al., 2026). Based on an econometric analysis of 192 NUTS-2 regions, the authors established that the most favourable conditions for the development of energy communities had emerged in regions with higher income levels, a substantial share of distributed renewable-energy generation, high-quality institutions, and active participation by local communities. At the same time, *cohesion-policy funding alone does not ensure the sustainable development of such communities in the absence of adequate institutional capacity at the regional level*. Thus, the authors identified the *decisive factors of success* not as the volume of financial resources, but rather the *quality of governance*, *the level of social trust, and the availability of political support for local energy initiatives* (Bianchi et al., 2026).

A practical example of the implementation of *the model of territorial energy autonomy* is provided by local energy projects in Spain. In Catalonia, the Taradell Sostenible energy community, with the support of the municipal authorities and the *Institute for the Diversification and Saving of Energy (Instituto para la Diversificación y Ahorro de la Energía, IDAE)*, supplies electricity to more than one hundred households through solar panels installed on the roofs of municipal sports and cultural facilities (The Guardian, 2025). At the same time, the IDAE public programme provides funding for approximately 200 similar local projects aimed at establishing territorially integrated energy communities that combine electricity generation, consumption, and distribution at the local level.

The strengthening of the regional level can also be observed in the evolution of EU cohesion policy, which is increasingly oriented towards supporting the development of energy facilities, particularly in rural communities. According to estimates by the European Commission's Joint Research Centre (JRC), rural areas generate approximately 280 terawatt-hours (TWh) of electricity annually from onshore wind generation, while their technical potential is estimated at 1,200 TWh per year. Hydropower generation in these regions amounts to approximately 280 TWh, although its potential for further expansion is estimated at an additional 25%.

Thus, the local and regional levels of governance are strengthening their *energy autonomy* and becoming one of the principal reserves for enhancing the *EU's overall energy autonomy* (Perpiñá Castillo et al., 2024).

Thus, the contemporary *model of Strategic Resilience of the European Union* is being shaped not only through the diversification of energy sources and the development of new technologies, but also through the institutional decentralization of energy policy.

The transfer of certain powers to regional authorities, municipalities, and territorial communities, together with the development of energy communities, local

generation systems, and regional energy clusters, contributes to the formation of a polycentric governance model in which even security-related issues are delegated according to the logic of place-based policy. Under this model, lower territorial levels of political organization become important actors in interaction among the supranational, national, and regional levels, thereby strengthening the institutional foundations for the *long-term Strategic Resilience and Autonomy* of the European Union.

Research findings and prospects for further research in this area.

Global competition for technological leadership, control over critical resources, logistical routes, supply chains, and the markets of the Global South has initiated the formation of a new architecture of international relations, in which the weaponization of economic interdependence, energy resources, critical infrastructure, and technological dependencies is becoming increasingly significant.

Under these conditions, energy diplomacy has moved beyond the boundaries of sectoral policy and has become one of the key instruments of geopolitical competition and the implementation of global geostrategies, thereby transforming the relationship between economic considerations, security, and politics.

The catalyst for the institutional transformation of the European Union was the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2022, which ultimately demonstrated the vulnerability of the liberal model of economic interdependence and created the political conditions for reconsidering the fundamental principles underlying the functioning of the EU.

It was under these conditions that the Union was able to move away from a predominantly economic logic of integration and develop a new model of strategic resilience, in which national, European, energy, technological, logistical, and defence security are regarded as interconnected components of a unified geostrategy aimed at ensuring strategic autonomy.

The EU's strategic response has been the transformation of its development model from the concept of "energy interdependence" towards Managed Energy Autonomy, which combines the diversification of energy sources and supply routes, the development of LNG infrastructure, support for Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), the development of an indigenous technological base, and the intensification of energy diplomacy.

At the same time, the energy space is becoming an arena of global competition among states, transnational corporations, and sectoral lobbying networks, within which the representation of the interests of energy and defence corporations has become an important factor in the formulation of strategic decisions within the EU.

In parallel, the development of the European defence-industrial complex the institutionalization of the defence dimension of the Union's geostrategy, in which economic, diplomatic, technological, and military-political instruments are increasingly regarded as complementary mechanisms for protecting strategic interests.

The strengthening of the European Union's geopolitical subjectivity is not accompanied by classical centralization of political governance. On the contrary, a new model is emerging in which the formulation of strategic decisions, coordination, and regulatory harmonization are concentrated at the supranational level, while their practical implementation increasingly relies on decentralization, cohesion

policy, multilevel governance, polycentrism, regions, municipalities, and energy communities. It is precisely the synergy between strategic centralization and functional decentralization that defines the emerging model of the European Union's development as a geopolitical actor capable of simultaneously ensuring internal cohesion, competitiveness, strategic autonomy, and effective protection of its interests within long-term global competition.

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ПОЛІТИКА СТРАТЕГІЧНОЇ СТІЙКОСТІ ЄВРОПЕЙСЬКОГО СОЮЗУ: ДЕЦЕНТРАЛІЗАЦІЯ, ЕНЕРГЕТИЧНА АВТОНОМІЯ ТА ТРАНСФОРМАЦІЯ БЕЗПЕКИ

Резюме

У статті здійснено політико-правовий аналіз трансформації політики Європейського Союзу в сфері стратегічної стійкості в умовах вепонізації економічної взаємозалежності, енергетичних ресурсів, критичної інфраструктури, технологічних залежностей і посилення глобальної геополітичної конкуренції.

Доведено, що відбувся концептуальний перехід від нормативно-економічної моделі інтеграції до моделі геополітичної суб'єктності ЄС, де безпекова, оборонна, енергетична, промислова, технологічна і територіальна політика інтегруються в цілісну модель забезпечення стратегічної автономії, інституційні засади якої були закладені в 2016 році. Каталізатором її практичної реалізації стали події 2022 р., які істотно прискорили трансформацію Спільної політики безпеки і оборони та перетворили стратегічну автономію з концептуальної ідеї на практичний інструмент геостратегічної консолідації ЄС. Простежено еволюцію уявлень про роль ЄС від концепції «цивільної сили» і «нормативної сили» через «принциповий прагматизм» до концепцій стратегічної автономії та стратегічної стійкості як нової парадигми макрорегіональної безпеки. Методологічною основою дослідження стали системний, інституційний, структурно-функціональний, порівняльно-політичний, геополітичний та геостратегічний підходи, що дали змогу простежити взаємозв'язок між трансформацією безпекової архітектури, розвитком енергетичної дипломатії, лобізмом і новими механізмами багаторівневого та поліцентричного врядування. Логіку дослідження побудовано на переході від аналізу концептуальної еволюції європейської безпеки до дослідження геостратегічної консолідації енергетичної політики, і далі – до територіального виміру стратегічної стійкості, заснованого на розвитку енергетичних спільнот, децентралізації та поліцентричному врядуванні. Обґрунтовано авторську концепцію керованої енергетичної автономії, що поєднує енергетичну дипломатію, диверсифікацію джерел постачання, розвиток енергетичної інфраструктури, відновлювальної та атомної енергетики. Встановлено, що геостратегічна консолідація ЄС реалізується через поєднання централізації стратегічного цілепокладання та нормативної уніфікації з децентралізацією практичних механізмів реалізації політики, у межах яких регіони, муніципалітети й енергетичні спільноти перетворюються на повноправних суб'єктів забезпечення національної та європейської безпеки. Показано, що енергетична дипломатія, лобіювання, політика згуртування та поліцентричне врядування формують взаємопов'язану систему інструментів нової геостратегії ЄС.

Key words: geopolitics, EU geostrategy, strategic autonomy, regional security, weaponization, energy security, energy diplomacy, lobbying, decentralization, політика стратегічні стійкості.

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