EVOLUTION OF RUSSIA’S NUCLEAR POLICY (2020–2024): ITS INTERPRETATIONS AND DOMESTIC POLITICAL FUNCTION
Abstract
The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the strategic documents of the Russian Federation, “Basic Principles of State Policy of the Russian Federation on Nuclear Deter- rence” (2020 and 2024), examined through comparative, historiographical, and domestic political perspectives. The relevance of the study is determined by the transformation of the role of the nuclear factor in the context of the full-scale Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as the growing importance of nuclear signaling as an instrument of both interna- tional and domestic politics. The study conducts a comparative analysis of two versions of the doctrinal documents, identifies the evolution of the conditions and thresholds for the use of nuclear weapons, and examines interpretations of these changes in Western and Ukrainian scholarship. Particular attention is paid to domestic political factors influ- encing the transformation of Russia’s nuclear policy, especially its role in regime legiti- mation and societal mobilization. The methodological framework combines comparative analysis of normative documents, historiographical review, and elements of discourse analysis of official statements by the Russian military-political leadership. The central hypothesis is that the 2024 revision of the doctrine reflects not only a formal expansion of the grounds for nuclear weapons use, but also an attempt to compensate for the declin- ing effectiveness of nuclear deterrence as an instrument of foreign policy coercion in the context of a prolonged war. The findings demonstrate that Russia’s nuclear doctrine has undergone a significant functional transformation – from a classical deterrence tool to a more flexible instrument of political pressure, strategic communication, and domestic legitimation. The study argues that the updated doctrine reflects a crisis in the credibil- ity of Russia’s nuclear threats while simultaneously indicating the growing role of the nuclear factor as an instrument of political signaling. In this context, “signaling” refers to the deliberate use of threats, statements, or doctrinal provisions to convey intentions, shape perceptions, and influence the behavior of external and internal audiences.
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